The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf by Abdo, Aliah
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal
Volume 5
Number 2 Summer 2008 Article 6
1-1-2008
The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A
Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal
Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf
Aliah Abdo
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_race_poverty_law_journal
Part of the Law and Race Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim
Headscarf, 5 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 441 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_race_poverty_law_journal/vol5/iss2/6
The Legal Status of Hijab in the United
States: A Look at the Sociopolitical




The hijab, the headscarf worn by many Muslim women, has
long been a topic of interest in the Western World, playing a part in
feminist, Orientalist, social, religious, and political discourse. It is
often misunderstood to be a symbol of oppression or a sign of
extremism, resulting in an idea that Muslim women need to be
liberated from hijab.1 Although such attention did not originate
with the events of September 11, 2001, in its aftermath, Islam and
manifestations of Islam, such as hijab, have been reexamined,
scrutinized, and further critiqued. This resulted from a combination
of fear fed by the media and political agendas, law enforcement
practices, social and political influences, cultural practices and
norms, and outright religious and cultural ignorance of Islam and
Muslims. This view falsely depicts the hijab-wearing woman as an
"oppressed, weakened woman, stripped of her 'equal rights', forced
to 'veil' her sexuality, and mandated as inferior by the tenets of
Islamic principle." 2 Despite the fact that this view is a severely
flawed and false reflection of Islamic principles, it has made the
hijab an easy target for post-9/11 backlash and is often used to
advance political agendas and facilitate and justify discrimination.
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A., University of
California Berkeley, 2003. I would like to thank Azzam Abdo, Pearl Abdo, Hillary
Baker, Nell Clement, Lisl Duncan, Lois Schwartz, Nazish Ekram, Mahin Ibrahim, and
Fatima Abdo for their help and support in this process.
1. Shazia N. Nagamia, Islamic Feminism: Unveiling the Western Stigma, 11 BuFF.
WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 37 (2002).
2. Id.
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Such religious ignorance has affected Muslim women in many facets
of their lives including education, work, travel, recreation, and the
ability to participate in the legal process in the courtrooms of our
nation.
Most often, reaction to hijab takes the form of
"microaggression," smaller everyday incidents of racism, committed
either consciously or subconsciously. 3 However, in some cases,
microaggression has led to greater acts of discrimination, such as
unfounded suspicion, islamophobic slurs, employment
discrimination, the vandalization of mosques, unwarranted
detentions, physical assaults, racial profiling, and even the murder
of several Muslims, Sikhs, and other people who stereotypically
resemble or are mistaken for Muslims. Human Rights Watch
reports that those most likely to be targeted for hate crimes were
those most easily identifiable as "Muslim," such as Muslim women
wearing hijab or Sikh men or women wearing turbans.4 This
climate of tension and discrimination has made everyday activities
especially difficult for Muslim women and other "Muslim-looking"
people.
Critical race theory, a branch of critical legal studies that is
concerned with issues of racism, emphasizes the socially
constructed nature of race. The "social construction" thesis
recognizes that race is a result of societal production. 5 Racial and
ethnic categories are invented, manipulated, and abandoned when
convenient. 6 The production of such categories often includes a set
of dehumanizing stereotypes and depictions dispersed by broadcast
media, cartoons, textbooks, movies, and other cultural mediums. In
different periods of history, various minority groups have been
racialized according to societal fears, often leading to state-
sanctioned atrocities such as the internment of 120,000 Japanese
Americans during World War 11.7 This racialization of minority
groups is usually preceded by a hostile political atmosphere for the
affected minority group, and includes extensive propaganda
campaigns directed against the group.8 Common tactics include the
use of "stereotypes, name substitution, lying, selective presentation
of facts, repetition, bold assertion of a single idea, creation of an
3. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 2 (NYU Press 2001).
4. Rachel Saloom, I Know You Are, But Mhat Am I? Arab-American Experiences
Through the Critical Race Theory Lens, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 55, 67 (2005).
5. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 3, at 7.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 8.
8. Id.
[Vol. 5
THE LEGAL STATUS OF HIJAB IN THE UNITED STATES
enemy, and appeal to authority." 9 A history of colonialization,10
Eurocentric and Orientalist discourse depicting non-Western
cultures as backward," combined with the Gulf War, the "War on
Terror," and the deteriorating situations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
have all contributed to the misunderstandings of Islam and
specifically, the hijab.12
The previous and current misunderstandings of Islam have
fostered several government and private party restrictions placed on
hijab, requiring removal in various settings. As discussed below,
the suggested rationales for such restrictions range from community
relations, to the liberation of Muslim women, to national security.
However, many Muslims understand such incidents to be matters of
ignorance or islamophobia and have responded in different ways.
Some Muslim women try to minimize public outings for fear of
harassment or feel a sense of shame or guilt for covering their hair
with hats, hoods, or other head coverings that appear to be less
identifiable as Muslim. Others have refused to allow such attitudes
to dictate their religious practices and societal participation. The
overall effect has been to pressure or even force outward
assimilation amongst Muslim women. Unfortunately, the judicial
response, thus far, has been inadequate to protect Muslim women's
civil liberties, particularly freedom of religion and freedom of
speech.
9. Petal Nevella Modeste, Race Hate Speech: The Pervasive Badge of Slavery that Mocks
the Thirteenth Amendment, 44 How. L.J. 311, 318 (2001).
10. Mohamed Elmasry, The Decolonialization of Islamic Culture: The Role of Language,
Religion, and Tradition, MEDIA MONITORS NETWORK, Apr. 6, 2007, http://world.
mediamonitors.net/headlines/the-de-colonialization-of-islamicculture-the-role-of-la
nguage-religionandtradition (discussing the effects colonial powers had on Muslim
societies). They did not simply overthrow local governments, but over time "destroyed
the languages, religions and traditions of native and indigenous peoples, through the
imposition of foreign education, media, art forms, literature and propaganda." Id.
Native languages were described as "inadequate," native religions were described as
"backward," and native traditions were described as "not worth keeping." Id.
According to Elmasry, once the natives "bought into this portrayal of their cultural
inferiority, it became an easy matter to recolonize their 'primitive' ways with foreign
political and economic systems." Id. Many of these colonial powers often cited religious
imperatives when they strove to "civilize" other parts of the world. Id.
11. See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Pantheon Books 1979) (describing a Western
academic and artistic tradition of hostile and deprecatory views of Eastern cultures and
peoples, shaped by the attitudes of an era of European imperialism in the Eighteenth
and Nineteenth centuries).
12. Elmasry, supra note 10. Elmasry describes the current and cumulative social,
political, and economic injustices committed against Muslim countries by the West as
"recolonialization," which often takes the form of obtaining natural resources such as
oil, obtaining strategic geopolitical positions, and obtaining a potential consumer market
of more than 1.2 billion Muslim people. Id. Such acts undoubtedly have a cultural
impact as well. Id.
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The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution is understood to guarantee free speech and the
free exercise of religion. The First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 13  However, the current
sociopolitical climate and treatment of Islam has been reflected and
even reinforced in the judicial realm whereby the hijab, and other
outward manifestations of ideology, have yet to be adequately
protected legally, both internationally and domestically. For a
Muslim woman, this means the legally sanctioned removal of hijab,
resulting in the outright abandonment of her right to freely exercise
her religion. In all of the United States cases addressing
discrimination on the basis of hijab, the courts have yet to rule on
the merits to protect a Muslim woman's right to religious freedom
regarding the hijab. United States courts in all cases have taken one
of three approaches: either the court has failed to protect a Muslim
woman's right to wear hijab; courts have avoided a decision on the
merits and ruled against the plaintiff, or; courts have formulated
arbitrary or inconsistent standards permitting the hijab only in the
event that it is no longer identifiable as Muslim. In the cases where
the courts have failed to protect a woman's right to wear hijab after
rendering a decision on the merits, it is often based on
misunderstandings about the religious necessity and purpose of
hijab. Instead of applying the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to protect a woman's right to wear hijab, these courts
have yielded to the hostile influences of the social and political
climate rather than constitutional jurisprudence to determine what
our Constitution means.
This note begins by providing a background on American
Muslims and the purpose and importance of hijab to Muslim
women. The note then proceeds to examine the various contexts
where hijab has been an issue in the American legal system; that is
where the government or private parties have required the removal
of hijab in educational settings, athletic competitions, airports,
driver license photos, employment, prison entry, and in court. In
the educational realm, the note compares international and domestic
trends prohibiting or placing restrictions on hijab for both students
and teachers. Finally, this note illustrates the alarming trend of
courts failing to protect the constitutional rights of Muslim women
because of misunderstandings and bias surrounding the hijab and
Islam.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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I. American Muslims and the Islamic Significance of
Hijab
A. Background on Muslims in America
In order to have a meaningful understanding of hijab and its
importance to Muslim women, it is important to be familiar with the
Muslim peoples and the basic tenets of Islamic law. The Arabic
word "Islam" is derived from the word "salam," which means
peace. 14 The word "Islam" means "submission, surrender, and
obedience," but as a religion, Islam represents the complete
submission to God so that one can achieve peace: peace with God,
peace with oneself, and peace with the creations of God. 15 Islam is
often seen by Muslim followers as a complete way of life in order to
achieve inner peace. 16
Muslims come from every race and nationality across the globe,
speak various languages, eat various foods, dress differently, and
adhere to different customs. There are approximately 1.3 billion
Muslims worldwide; about one in every five people on earth is
Muslim. 17 However, contrary to common misconceptions, about 18
percent of Muslims are Arab and about 20 percent are in Sub-
Saharan Africa.18 The world's largest Muslim population, 19 of more
than two hundred million, resides in Indonesia, the world's fourth
most populous nation.20  There are also substantial groups of
Muslims in China, India, Russia, Europe, North America, and South
America.21
There are about eight million Muslims in the United States,
representing more than fifty different ethnicities and nationalities. 22
14. ABuL A'LA MAWDUDI, TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING ISLAM 1-2 (American Trust
Publications 1986).
15. Id.
16. Some of the major religious practices include the five pillars of Islam: the
shahadah, a declaration of faith that "there is no god except Allah, and Muhammad is the
messenger of Allah"; salah, the five daily prayers; sawm, fasting during the month of
Ramadan; zakat, alms giving to the poor, and; haj, the pilgrimage to Mecca. See id. at,
115-125.
17. Major Religions of the World Ranked by Number of Adherents, Adherents.com,
http://www.adherents.com/Religions-By-Adherents.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
18. DISCOVER ISLAM, DISCOVER ISLAM: THE READER, No. E01 (Transcom International
1997).
19. Id.
20. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Background
Note: Indonesia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2008).
21. DISCOVER ISLAM, supra note 18.
22. Ali S. Asani, "So That You May Know One Another": A Muslim American Reflects on
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Many of these Muslims were born in the United States, while others
came as immigrants or converted to Islam. The first group of
Muslims that came to the United States were African Muslims
forcibly brought to the United States as slaves, beginning in the
1530s, from Fulas, Fula Jallon, Fula Toro, and Massionia, as well as
other parts of West Africa. 23 It is estimated that between 30 percent
and 40 percent of West African slaves brought to the United States
were Muslim.24 In the late 1800s, large numbers of immigrants also
arrived from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, and Egypt, many
of whom were Muslim. 25 Today, African Americans make up the
largest group of Muslims in the United States. Thus, when dealing
with issues of hijab in the United States, racial minorities,
particularly women of color, are disproportionately affected by
restrictions placed on wearing hijab.
As the Muslim population is extremely diverse, both globally
and within the United States, so is the way Islam is practiced. There
are different sects of Islam and four Sunni schools of Islamic law.
As hijab is discussed in this note, it is important to recognize that
Muslim women make up a very diverse group of people from
different backgrounds; some who wear hijab; some who do not
despite religious doctrine; some who began wearing hijab when
they were young; some who did so later in life; some who converted
to Islam; some who were born into Islam; some who came to the
United States as immigrants; and some who were born and raised
here in the United States. 26 Accordingly, Muslim women have
various styles, understandings, and personal reasons for wearing
hijab. However, there is a unifying factor amongst Muslim women
who wear hijab: that hijab is a religious obligation and any policy
prohibiting the wearing of hijab is a requirement that they violate
their religious beliefs.
B. Hijab in Islam
The controversy surrounding hijab in the Western Society is
often based on misunderstandings and misperceptions of Islam,
particularly in relation to women. Many have been quick to criticize
the hijab, as some view Muslim women as oppressed beings, forced
Pluralism and Islam, in ISLAM: ENDURING MYTHS AND CHANGING REALITIES 588 ANNALS
40, 49 (2003).
23. Fareed H. Numan, American Muslim History, ISLAM 101, Dec. 1992, http://
www.islamlOl.com/history/muslim_us_hist.html.
24. SYLVIANE A. DIOUF, SERVANTS OF ALLAH, AFRICAN MUSLIMS ENSLAVED IN THE
AMERICAS 48 (NYU Press 1998).
25. Saloom, supra note 4, at 59.
26. Asani, supra note 22, at 49.
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to cover. However, there is a major distinction between "Islamic
culture" and "Muslim culture." Islamic culture, which adheres to
the tenets of Islamic principles, is very desirable to the Muslim
community, while Muslim culture is the way adherents to the
Islamic faith practice the religion and is subject "to the same human
weaknesses and inconsistencies of any ethnic community." 27 For
example, some majority Muslim countries, like many secular
societies, do not afford basic human rights, educational
opportunities, legal status, and vocational opportunities to
women. 28 However, Islam prescribes equality between the sexes.
Muslims believe that every person is responsible for his or her
own actions and that all stand equal before God. Women in Islam,
like men, are viewed as individuals with specific rights such as the
right to learn, earn income, own property, choose a husband, be
treated equally, and inherit.29 Muslim women also keep their own
family names rather than adopting her husband's after marriage. 30
The roles of men and women in Islam are "complementary and
collaborative" so that the rights and responsibilities of each sex are
"equitable and balanced in their totality." 31 According to Islamic
law, the only characteristic that makes a man or woman "chosen" is
his or her piety, not gender.3 2 The Qur'an states:
"Lo! Men who surrender unto Allah, and women who surrender,
and men who believe and women who believe, and men who
obey and women who obey, and men who speak the truth and
women who speak the truth, and men persevere (in
righteousness) and women who persevere, and men who are
humble and women who are humble, and men who give alms
and women who give alms, and men who fast and women who
fast, and men who guard (their modesty) and women who guard
(their modesty), and men who remember Allah much and women
who remember Allah - Allah hath prepared for them forgiveness
and a vast reward." 33
Despite these egalitarian tenets, Muslim women are often
misrepresented in the West as being weak, oppressed, passive,
27. Elmasry, supra note 10.
28. Id.
29. DISCOVER ISLAM, supra note 18.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. M.I. SIDDIQI, FAMILY LAWS OF ISLAM 34 (International Islamic Publishers 1994).
33. AL-QUR'AN 33:35-37. See also AL-QUR'AN 2:256 ("o Mankind! We created you
from a single soul, male and female, and made you into peoples and tribes, so that you
may come to know one another. Truly, the most honored of you in God's sight is the
greatest of you in piety. God is All-Knowing, All-Aware.").
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voiceless, uneducated, faceless, and subjected to the will of men;
often making Muslim women the "object of imperialist rescue." 34
The hijab has been the focus of this misconception. Contrary to the
stereotype, the Qur'an itself prohibits forcing one to accept or
practice Islam, as "there is no compulsion in religion." 35 It is true
that some political regimes attempt to force the hijab upon women
just as some societies and individuals force its removal. However,
forcing one to wear or remove hijab is against the tenets of Islam
and the vast majority of Muslim women that wear hijab do so by
independent choice. 36
The most fundamental source of Islamic law is the Qur'an,
which prescribes the hijab. The hijab is explained in greater detail
through in the Haditli, the recorded sayings and actions of the
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).37 Although people usually discuss
hijab only in the context of women, the Qur'an prescribes for both
Muslim men and women to be modest, in both character and
dress. 38 Any differences between the Islamic dress of men and
women concerns the "differences between men and women in
nature, temperament, and social life." 39
The Arabic word hijab stems from the word hajaba, meaning "to
prevent from seeing." 40  In Islamic scholarship, hijab refers to
broader notions of modesty, privacy, and morality. 41 The two
verses in which hijab is described in the Qur'an are translated as
follows:
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze
and guard their modesty; that they should not display their
beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear
thereof; that they should draw veils over their bosoms and not
display their beauty. .... 42
34. Saloom, supra note 4, at 71.
35. AL-QUR'AN 2:256.
36. See Sultana Yusufali, A Lesson to be Learned, http://www.jannah.org/sisters/
sultana.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008); Sehmina Jaffer Chopra, Liberation by the Veil,
http://www.jannah.org/sisters/hijbene.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
37. Whenever Muslims refer to the Prophet Muhammad, his name is traditionally
followed by ("PBUH"), which stands for "peace be upon him."
38. AL-QUR'AN 24:30 ("Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze
and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them: and Allah is well
acquainted with all that they do.").
39. Abdul Rahman I. Doi, Women in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, ISLAM FOR TODAY, at
11 (1993), available at http://www.islamfortoday.com/womeninqands.htm.
40. Mary C. Ali, Hijab: Suppression or Liberation?, INST. OF ISLAMIC INFO. & EDUC.
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O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of
the believers to draw their cloaks close round them. That will be
better, so that they may be recognized and not annoyed. Allah is
ever Forgiving, Merciful.43
To fulfill the physical requirements of hijab, the Hadith explains
that Muslim women should cover their entire bodies, with the
exception of the hands, face, and feet, upon the age of puberty. 44
This includes wearing opaque and loose clothing in front of all
males other than the woman's husband, father, grandfather,
brothers, uncles, sons, nephews, father-in-law, and young children,
referred to as non-mahram males. 45 Muslim women are generally not
required to wear hijab when they are only in the presence of
women, although there are some interpretations of Islamic thought
addressing whether Muslim women are required to cover in front of
non-Muslim women.46 Some Muslim women also cover their face
with iziqab, which is another interpretation of Islamic dress. In
addition to the physical aspects of hijab, hijab is also a state of mind,
behavior, and lifestyle.
Hijab is not only a hijab of the clothing, but also hijab of the
heart and intention. 47 It is a choice to be modest, both in character
and appearance, not just physical modesty, but also in one's
thoughts, speech, and actions. 48 The idea is to remove focus from
the physical aspects of a woman, from a personal perspective as
well as that of others, so that the focus may be on the mind,
character, and spirituality of the woman, rather than her body and
appearance. 49 It sends a message that she is a Muslim, has respect
for herself, and expects to be treated respectfully, especially by the
opposite sex.50 Hijab is not only meant to guard women from
inappropriate leering male attention, but it is considered to be a
liberating experience to be free from societal expectations and
judgments over a woman's body and other physical
characteristics. 51  A 17-year-old Toronto high school student
described it as "one of the most fundamental aspects of female
43. AL-QUR'AN 33:59.
44. Young Muslims in Pursuit of Allah's Pleasure, Hijab: Fabric, Fad, or Faith?,
http://\ww.youngmuslims.ca/publications/hijab.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2008).
45. AL-QUR'AN 24:31.
46. Id.
47. Ali, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Chopra, supra note 36.
50. Id.
51. See Yusufali, supra note 36; Chopra, stupra note 36.
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empowerment" because it frees her from "the bondage of the
swinging pendulum of the fashion industry and other institutions
that exploit females." 52 Another Muslim woman explained that the
hijab brings about an "aura of respect, and bestows upon her a
separate and unique identity." 53 She explained, "superficial beauty
is not the Muslim woman's concern, her main goal is inner spiritual
beauty."5 4  Hijab also represents egalitarianism, community,
identity, privacy, and justice for the Muslim community.
The concept of wearing a veil is not unique to Islam. Roman
Catholic nuns often wear veils and many Catholics have
traditionally worn ceremonial veils to church. Mormon women
wear veils as part of their temple clothing and many Sikh women
wear head coverings. Also, Orthodox Jewish women often cover
their hair with scarves, hats, or wigs. Hijab is an important aspect to
a Muslim woman's identity under the tenets of Islamic law; it is a
symbol that she is a person with high moral standards who places
her mind and spirituality before physical appearance. 55 However,
the American legal system has not yet recognized the importance of
hijab to Muslim women, nor has it adequately protected the practice
of such a central religious obligation under the Free Exercise Clause
of the United States Constitution.
II. The First Amendment: Freedom of Religion
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government of
grievances." 56  Within the First Amendment are two religion
clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. The
Establishment Clause prevents the government from establishing or
endorsing an official or de facto state religion while the Free
Exercise Clause prevents the government from interfering with a
person's religious beliefs. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the
government "may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish
the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose
special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status,
or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over
52. Yusufali, supra note 36.
53. Chopra, supra note 36,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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religious dogma."57 This includes discriminating against a person
for holding beliefs contrary to those of others. 58  The First
Amendment applies to actions of the federal government, and is
applicable to the states and their subdivisions through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 9
The Free Exercise Clause is an absolute prohibition against
governmental regulation of religious beliefs. 60 The Supreme Court
has stated that freedom of conscience and the ability to adhere to
religious beliefs as an individual chooses cannot be restricted by
law. 61 However, there is a fine line between unconstitutional
prohibitions on the practice of religion and legitimate governmental
conduct in managing its own affairs in relation to an individual's
belief system. Thus, while freedom of belief is absolute, freedom of
conduct is not; the government is generally not required to conduct
its affairs in accordance with the individual beliefs of particular
citizens when it has a legitimate governmental interest. 62
Traditionally, the Supreme Court held that laws that
substantially burdened" the free exercise of religion must be
justified by a "compelling interest" to survive scrutiny under the
First Amendment. 63 However, in 1990, the Supreme Court in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith
tightened the standard and held that a law does not offend the First
Amendment if it is neutral towards religion and only incidentally
affects religion, as long as it is "generally applicable and otherwise
valid." 64 Although Smith is often viewed as abandoning strict
scrutiny, it did not abandon heightened scrutiny for neutral laws of
general application under the "hybrid-rights exception." 65 Under
the hybrid-rights exception, "strict scrutiny will be given to a free
exercise claim when it is coupled with another, independent
constitutional claim," such as the freedom of expression.66 In such
cases, the First Amendment bars the application of neutral,
57. Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990).
58. School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 317 (1963).
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
60. Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983).
61. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203.
62. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
63. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
64. 494 U.S. at 878.
65. Id.
66. Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of
Free Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 369 (citing George
W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 707, 712 (1993)).
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generally applicable law to religiously motivated actions. 67 The
state would then need a compelling governmental interest for its
action to be upheld as constitutional. 68
In reaction to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which provides that the government
cannot "substantially burden" religious conduct even by "a rule of
general applicability" unless the government proves that the burden
is the "least restrictive means of furthering... a compelling
governmental interest." 69 If state actions that serve a legitimate state
interest also affect an individual's religious beliefs, the state should
take the least restrictive means in achieving their goals and respect
religious beliefs to the maximum extent possible. Unfortunately,
this has not always been the case, especially in relation to hijab.
III. International and Domestic Restrictions on Hijab
There have been many instances where government officials
and private parties have required the removal of hijab, some of
which have been litigated, some are in pending litigation, and some
that have yet to be litigated. The purpose of this section is to
examine the many contexts in which such restrictions are placed and
the failure of the courts to adequately protect hijab or acknowledge
its religious significance. Hijab bans have occurred with regards to
education, employment, prison entry, driver license photos, airport
security, athletic competitions, and courtrooms. Such categories are
by no means comprehensive, but provide a sample of the types of
issues that have emerged in recent years.
A. Hijab Bans in the Educational Context
The wearing of hijab in public educational institutions is one of
the most controversial contexts regarding hijab in the international
arena. Increasing prohibitions on hijab in schools are emerging
internationally and within the United States. All these situations
have resulted in the failure to protect Muslim women's rights to
practice their religion. The majority of education-related hijab bans
have occurred in Europe. There have also been bans in Asian and
67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
68. Id.
69. Pub. L. No. 103-141, codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000bb. Note that although the
Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that RFRA was
beyond the scope of congressional power, the fact remains that freedom of belief is
unregulated while freedom of conduct is only regulated if it is rationally related a
legitimate state objective.
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African countries in attempts to appear more "Western" or secular.
This xenophobic trend has resulted in the exclusion of many Muslim
students and teachers from the classroom.
1. International Hijab Bans in Schools
a. Turkey
Turkey was the first country to ban hijab through a sweeping
prohibition applicable to public schools, universities, and in the
workplace for official employees. 70 Ninety-nine percent of the
Turkish population is Muslim. 71 Modern Turkey is a secular,
democratic, unitary, constitutional republic that was established by
Mustafa Kamal Ataturk in 1923.72 Ataturk focused on modernizing
and westernizing Turkey through social and political reforms
known as "Kemalism," which included secularism, strong
nationalism, and western orientation. 73 Kemalism survives today
and is a significant part of Turkish social and political thought,
especially in relation to hijab. As a result, some view the hijab as a
"direct challenge to Western lifestyles, a symbol of ignorance and
backwardness." 74 As of the year 2000, more than 37,000 Muslim
girls were expelled from school for wearing hijab, and more than
24,000 teachers were fired for wearing hijab.75 Hijab bans have
extended to students who have tried to sidestep the ban by wearing
wigs to campus, and has even affected hijab-wearing mothers who
have tried to attend their children's graduations. 76 The hijab ban
has also affected elected parliament members, judges, soldiers, and
patients seeking treatment in hospitals.77
The most highly publicized hijab ban case is Sahin v. Turkey,
70. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background
Note: Turkey, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2008).
71. Id.
72. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Turkey, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2008).
73. U.S. Department of State, supra note 70.
74. Nicholas Birch, Turkey Divided Over Headscarf Ban Decision, THE INDEP., Jan. 28,
2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/europe/turkey-divided-over-headscarf-
ban-decision-774865.html.
75. Faisal Kutty, Ousted Turkish M.P. Merve Kavakci Calls on Canada to Help Hijab-
Wearing Muslim Women, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2000,
http://www.wrmea.com/archives/Jan-Feb 2001/0101048.html.
76. Birch, supra note 74.
77. Hijab Ban News, Quick Briefing - Turkey, http://www.prohijab.net/
english/turkey-hijab-news.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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where a Muslim woman in her fifth year at the Faculty of Medicine
at the University of Bursa was denied entrance to one of her
university exams for wearing hijab, even though she had worn hijab
during her first four years at the university. 78 In February 1998, the
vice chancellor of the university issued a circular stating that
"students whose 'heads are covered' and students with beards must
not be admitted to lectures, courses or tutorials" and the "name and
number of any student with a beard or wearing the Islamic
headscarf must not be added to the lists of registered students." 79
Sahin was thereafter prohibited from entering university lectures
and exams.8 0
Sahin brought her case to the European Commission of Human
Rights. In June of 2004, the European Court of Human Rights ruled
that there had been no violations of her "freedom of thought,
conscience and religion under Convention Article 9"81 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. 82 The Court reasoned that overarching secularist and
equality principles permit the ban of religious manifestations in
state institutions, including schools and universities. 83 The Court
stated that the limitations placed on wearing hijab were justified as
"necessary" for protecting the "public order, health or morals, or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."8 4 However, the
78. Daniel Bodansky, International Decision: Sahin v. Turkey; "Teacher Headscarf" Case
(Cindy Skach): ECHR and German Constitutional Court decisions on wearing Islamic head-
scarves, 100 A.J.I.L. 186, 187 (2006).
79. Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.
80. Id.
81. Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
See also T. Jeremy Gunn, Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of
Human Rights 1 n.2 (Strasbourg Conference draft, July 2005), available at http://www.
strasbourgconference.org/papers/Sahin%20by%2Gunn%2021%20by%20T.%20Jeremy
%20Gunn.pdf.
82. Sahin, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R..
83. Ian Ward, Headscarf Stories, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 315, 324 (2006).
84. Id.
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Court did not specify or explain just how allowing Sahin to wear
hijab would have an effect on other peoples' freedoms and rights.
The rationales put forth by the European Court of Human Rights in
Sahin were later used in other European countries to justify the
banning of hijab and other religious items in the classroom.85
The Turkish hijab ban is not limited to students at educational
institutions, but also to government employees including teachers,
state hospital workers, and elected officials.8 6 The story of Merve
Kavakci is an example of what the hijab ban means for elected
Turkish officials. In 1999, Merve Kavakci, was elected to be a
member of the Turkish parliament.8 7 She was precluded from
taking her oath of office because she wore hijab and was even booed
out of parliament by members of the ruling Democratic Social Leftist
Party.88 In the 1980s, Kavakci's mother was forced to leave her
position as a professor at a Turkish university for wearing hijab. 89
In 1988, Kavakci herself was kicked out of medical school for the
same reason.90 After Kavakci was removed from parliament, she
was stripped of her Turkish citizenship. 91  She now lives in
Washington D.C. with her family and is involved in lobbying
Western governments to pressure the Turkish government to
protect the human rights and religious freedoms of all Turkish
citizens. 92 Commenting on the Turkish hijab ban, Kavakci stated: "I
have hope for Turkey that it would integrate into the Western world
without ending its Islamic bonds with the East.... I want to point
out the double standard and hypocrisy of the Western world in
standing up for women in Afghanistan and Iran, while they ignore
the right of the majority of women in Turkey who are precluded
from school, work and society for simply covering their hair." 93
Since the Turkish Justice and Development Party ("AKP") came
to power in 2002, the party has been under immense pressure to
abolish the headscarf ban.94  On February 9, 2008, Turkish
parliament members voted 411-103 to amend the constitution so that
85. See infra text accompanying sections IV.A.l.b-c.
86. Paul de Bendern, Turkish President Backs Lifting of Headscarf Ban, REUTERS, Jan. 25,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL254217320080125?feedType=
RSS&feedName=worldNews&pageNumber=l&virtualBrandChannel=0.







94. Selcan Hacaoglu, Turkish Lawmakers Vote on Head Scarves, ABC NEWS, Feb. 9,
2008, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=4266357.
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hijabs can be worn in public universities. 95 The amendment does
not specifically state that hijab in universities will be permitted, but
states that "no one can be deprived of (his or her) right to higher
education." 96 In the past, the President would have vetoed this
amendment, but Abdullah Gul, the former AKP foreign minister,
has taken office and has backed the amendments. 97 Gul stated that
"beliefs should be practiced freely" and "universities should not be
places of political controversy." 98
Despite the reversal of the ban in universities, restrictions
remain for pre-university students and government employees. In
addition, the types of hijabs that can be worn at universities are
limited. Hijabs tied under the chin are permitted because they are
said to appear to be more Turkish in nature, but wrap-around
headscarves and face veils are not. 99 A vocal Turkish minority
believes that the hijab ban is essential because they believe hijab to
be a "direct challenge to Western lifestyles, a symbol of ignorance
and oppression." 100 One lawmaker, Canan Aritman, of the main
opposition, the Republican People's Party, stated that the partial
reversal of the ban would be appealed because "we will never allow
our country to be dragged into the dark ages." 101 The Constitutional
Court is already reviewing an appeal by the secularist Republican
People's Party on the validity of the amendment and a state
prosecutor has asked Turkey's highest court to shut down the ruling
AKP for "undermining secularism." 102 The United States has not
taken any steps to support the rights of Muslim Turkish women to
wear hijab. Instead, anti-hijab attitudes and bans have spread to
other parts of Europe and have crept into the United States as well.
b. France
In France, the current hijab controversy began in 1989 in a case
where three Muslim girls were suspended from school for wearing
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Birch, supra note 74.
98. Id.




101. Turkish Lawmakers Vote to Lift Headscarf Ban, MSNBc, Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/23081329/.




THE LEGAL STATUS OF HIJAB IN THE UNITED STATES
hijab at a public school in Creil. 103 The Conseil d'Etat, the highest
administrative court in France, found that although schools are to
remain secular, students could wear religious symbols as long as
they are not "ostentatious" and do not pressure, provoke,
proselytize, propagandize, or disrupt school functions.104 The court
left it up to school officials to determine whether, on a case by case
basis, each religious symbol meets this standard. 105 This decision
sparked a national debate and put France's 5 percent to 10 percent
Muslim population on the defensive. 106
After the Conseil d'Etat's decision, many schools began and
continue to expel Muslim girls from school for wearing hijab on the
basis that it disrupts the education of students and constitutes
religious and political propaganda. 07 In 1994, the Minister of
Education issued a directive prohibiting "ostentatious" religious
symbols in public schools to "narrow the circumstances under
which the headscarf would be considered permissible." 108  The
debate surrounding hijab escalated in 2003 when politicians called
for a hijab ban in public schools, emphasizing the need for
secularism and focusing on the so-called "inferior position" of
Muslim women. 109
In early 2004, in an attempt to promote a secular French public
sphere, a law was passed prohibiting the wearing of "religious
symbols" that "exhibit conspicuously a religious affiliation"
including large Christian crosses, Sikh turbans, Jewish yarmulkes,
and the Muslim hijab.1n 0 Although the ban is said to prohibit all
"ostentatious" religious symbols, in effect, this ban has been
considered to specifically target the hijab and turbans. In practice,
there have been no student suspensions for wearing Christian
crosses or Jewish yarmulkes, as there have been for Muslims
wearing hijab or Sikhs wearing turbans."' In addition, although the
ban is facially neutral between religious groups, it disparately
impacts minority religions because the law does not prohibit the
wearing of small Christian crosses, which are not typically viewed
103. Stephanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves from French Public
Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 251 (2006).
104. Id. at 256.
105. Id. at 257.
106. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: France, https://www.cia.
gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/fr.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
107. Walterick, supra note 103, at 257.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 256.
110. Id. at 251.
111. Cynthia DeBula Baines, L'Affaire des Foulards - Discrimination, or the Price of a
Secular Public Education System?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 304 (1996).
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as a religious requirement like the hijab, the turban, and the
yarmulke. Furthermore, the law itself arose out of a long
controversy surrounding the wearing of hijab, where discourse
focused upon eliminating the hijab specifically, and altogether, from
public schools. 112 Relying on misconceptions and stereotypes of its
Muslim population, the purpose of the ban is to promote
assimilation, counter sexism, and reduce Islamic fundamentalism
within the Muslim community in France. 113
Although some Muslim girls have reluctantly complied with
the hijab ban, many have been expelled from school, forced to
relocate or had no choice but to attend a private school. 114 Those
who do not have the means to find a different school are often
denied an education altogether.115 Unfortunately, because of the
European Commission of Human Rights decision in Sahin v. Turkey,
it is unlikely that a challenge to the French law will be successful,
and there has been little or no pressure by other nations such as the
United States, to lift the ban.116
c. Germany
Articles Three and Four of the German Constitution guarantee
freedom of religion and the equal treatment of people from all
religious backgrounds. 1 7 Unlike the United States and France, the
separation between church and state in Germany does not require a
strict separation between the two in order to effectuate religious
freedom.118 Germany is generally considered to be more tolerant of
religion in schools, as it is not unusual to see Christian religious
symbolism in the classroom such as crosses and nuns' habits.1 19
However, for minority religions, such as Islam, where Muslims
make up less than four percent of the population,120 the situation
112. Walterick, supra note 103, at 251.
113. Baines, supra note 111, at 304.
114. Walterick, supra note 103, at 261.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 262.
117. Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [federal constitution] art.III, cl.
3 (F.R.G.) ("No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his
race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his religious or political
opinions."); Id. art. IV, cl. 1-2 ("Freedom of faith and of conscience and freedom or creed
religious or ideological are inviolable. The undisturbed practice of religion is
guaranteed.").
118. Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and the United
States, 28 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 405, 441 (2000).
119. Walterick, supra note 103, at 271.
120. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Germany, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/gm.html (last visited Apr. 18 2008).
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has been quite different.
In a case known as the Teacher Headscarf case, a Muslim teacher
wearing hijab was prevented from applying for a teaching position
in the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg because it was
supposedly "not suitable" for a teaching position and had an
unspecified "signaling effect" that would undermine state
neutrality. 121  Supporting the prohibition, the school district
incorrectly argued that because hijab is a cultural and political
symbol, not only a religious item, permitting hijab would unduly
influence the students and contradict state neutrality principles. 122
After several appeals through the German administrative courts, the
German Constitutional Court ruled that the school district could not
prohibit hijab without a state law prohibiting the wearing of
religious garb, because the regulations relied upon were
ambiguous. 123 However, the court noted that the legislature could
enact new laws prohibiting hijab if they determine that it is
necessary in an age of increasing religious pluralism in order to
prevent potential conflict.124
The Teacher Headscarf decision was considered to be very
controversial for allowing Muslim teachers to wear hijab and for
lacking clarity about what would constitute a legitimate reason to
ban hijab. 125 With the rising number of Muslim immigrants in
Germany and increasing backlash against them, the hijab ban
controversy reflects Germany's distrust and discomfort towards its
Muslim population. Many proponents of the hijab ban mistakenly
view the hijab as a symbol of fundamentalism, oppression, or a
refusal to assimilate into German society. 126
As a result of the court's decision in the Teacher Headscarf case,
at least six German states banned the wearing of hijab for teachers in
the classroom 127 including North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Saarland. 128 Bavaria and
Hesse have specifically prohibited hijab while allowing Christian
religious symbols in the classroom. 29 In Hesse, a German state
121. Bodansky, supra note 78, at 188.
122. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] Sept. 24, 2003,
108 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 282 (303) (F.R.G.);
Walterick, supra note 103, at 272.
123. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [federal constitutional court] Sept. 24, 2003,
108 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 282 (303) (F.R.G.).
124. Id.
125. Walterick, supra note 103, at 272.
126. Id. at 274.
127. Id.
128. Another German State to Curb Hijab, AL JAZEERA, Oct. 26, 2005, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=15772.
129. Walterick, supra note 103, at 274.
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court even upheld an extended ban on hijab for both public school
teachers and civil servants. 130 The Hesse ban includes religious
clothing or items that appear religious in nature, but has an
exception for Christian symbols.131 Such policies clearly target Islam
based on common misconceptions and stereotypes.
In October 2004, the German federal administrative court
responded to a law passed in Baden-Wurttemberg that prohibited
teachers from wearing hijab. 132 It declared that bans on religious
symbols had to apply equally to all religious symbols, and could not
specifically target Muslim religious attire. 133 Now, like France,
German states are still permitted to place restrictions on hijab as
long as other religious symbols are also prohibited. The laws make
no distinction between items that merely express religious belief and
items considered to be religious requirements.
d. Other Hijab Bans in Europe
Several other European countries have proposed or
implemented hijab bans. In Belgium,134 legislation was proposed in
2004 to prohibit Muslim students and teachers from wearing hijab in
public educational institutions. 135 Relying on misconceptions of
Islam, proponents of the law argue that it is necessary to place
restrictions on the hijab in an attempt to challenge gender
inequality, combat Islamic fundamentalism, and preserve state
neutrality. 136 The city of Antwerp, Belgium, declared that in order
to promote religious neutrality, those employees hired by local
authorities whose jobs entail contact with the public, cannot wear
religious symbols. 137 There is an exception for Muslim women
working in childcare. They may cover their hair with bandanas, but
cannot wear hijab.13 8  The exception was considered to be a
130. Jeannie Shawl, Germany State Court Upholds Teacher Headscarf Ban, JURIST: LEGAL
NEWS AND RESEARCH, Dec. 10, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2007/12/germany-state-court-upholds-teacher.php.
131. Id.
132. Walterick, supra note 103, at 274-75.
133. Id.
134. Although the Muslim population in Belgium is not specified because several
minority religious are grouped together in its census, Islam is considered a "recognized"
religion in Belgium. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs,
Background Note: Belgium, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2874.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2008).
135. Walterick, supra note 103, at 275.
136. Id.
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"welcome[d] compromise" by Belgium's Centre for Equal
Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, because bandanas are
considered to be a more neutral garment with no religious
connotations. 139 However, it remains a restriction on the right of
Muslim women to practice their religion, forcing outward
assimilation on the basis of a mistaken view of Islamic principles.
Sweden and Norway have also considered similar legislation to
ban hijab in public schools, but this legislation has not taken
widespread effect.' 40 In Sweden, Muslims make up about 3 percent
of the population.141 In 2006, a school in the northern town of
Umea, Sweden, banned the hijab. The ban extended to "all
headgear in the classroom," regardless of religious necessity. 142
Ultimately, the Swedish National Agency for Education determined
that a full headgear ban is not permissible because it excludes
students that wear scarves for religious reasons, and constitutes an
indirect form of discrimination on the basis of religion.143 However,
schools are allowed to prohibit the niqab, because it is said to
"impede teacher-pupil communication." 144
In Norway, where Muslims make up less than 2 percent of the
population,145 the Progress Party's parliamentary group proposed a
law in 2004 that would ban the hijab from elementary schools, and
raised a debate over forbidding hijab in schools altogether. 146 It also
considered increasing the ability of employers to enforce dress
codes, with the professed goal of integrating Muslim women into
society and protecting them from repression. 147 Siv Jensen, the
Progress Party leader, explained that the proposal did not consider
banning religious symbols such as the crucifix, turban, or calotte,
because in his misguided view, the hijab is a political symbol, not a
religious one. 148 However, Education Minister Kristin Clemet told
139. Id.
140. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and
the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 743, 774 (2006).
141. Swedish Education Agency Rejects Veil Ban, THE LOCAL: SWEDEN'S NEWS ENG., Jan.





145. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Norway, http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35476.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
146. Jonathan Tisdall, No Plans to Ban Hijab in Norwegian Schools, AFTENPOSTEN: NEWS
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parliament that she had no plans to ban hijab, explaining that the
government had no reason to view the hijab as an "obstacle to
education or integration in schools." 149  She explained: "It is
typically Norwegian clothing that has caused more problems in
Norwegian schools, from the feedback I have had." 150
In March 2007, the British government also announced that
schools can ban hijab for students in the classroom as part of the
uniform policy if the teacher believes that the hijab will affect the
safety or security of the students or student learning. 151 Educators
are urged to speak with the parents and Muslim community leaders
before making such decisions on behalf of the three percent Muslim
population.5 2 British Schools Minister, Jim Knight, acknowledged
the importance of trying to accommodate "social, religious, or
medical requirements of individual pupils," but stated that the
"safety, security, and effective learning in the school must always
take precedence." 153 Again, there was no explanation of how hijab
would impact such concerns. The hijab ban in Britain is hardly
surprising considering Prime Minister Tony Blair's October 2006
comments regarding hijab. Blair declared hijab to be a "mark of
separation," perhaps indicating the true motivation behind such
decisions to permit hijab bans in British schools. 54
e. Hijab Bans in Tunisia, Singapore, and Somalia
Tunisia, Singapore, and Somalia have also instituted hijab bans
in recent years. In 1981, a decree banning hijab was passed in
Tunisia because certain government officials believed it to be a
political symbol,155 even though 98 percent of the population of
Tunisia is Muslim. 156 Since Tunisia's independence from France in
1956, the government has taken a harsh stance against Islamic
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. UK Schools Given Veil Ban Powers, CNN, Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/
2007/WORLD/europe/03/20/ story.veil.ban.ap/index.html (last visited Mar. 2007).
152. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United Kingdom, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2008).
153. Id.
154. English Schools Get Right to Ban Muslim Veils, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL2071360120070320.
155. Gabriel Haboubi, Tunisia Presses Enforcement of Muslim Headscarf Ban, JURIST:
LEGAL NEWS AND RESEARCH, Oct. 20, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/
10/tunisia-presses-enforcement-of-muslim.php.
156. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Tunisia, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/ ts.html#People (last visited Apr. 18,
2008).
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political opposition, even if that means restricting religious
freedom.157 In 2006, the Tunisian government launched a new
campaign against wearing hijab that "prohibits women from
wearing Islamic headscarves in public places" including schools and
government offices. 158 Hijab is said to be banned in order to be in
accord with "Tunisian traditions" 159 and to make Islam "anchored
in modernity."' 160 The Secretary-General of Tunisia's Constitutional
Democratic Rally political party (the party of current President Zine
El Abidine Ben Ali), without support for his statements, reasoned:
"If we accept today the wearing of the headscarf, tomorrow we'll be
led to accept that a woman's right to work, to vote and to education
should be denied, and that she should be confined to a procreating
role." 161 Despite this severely flawed view of Islamic principles,
police officers have been stopping Muslim women on the street,
asking them to remove their hijabs, and getting them to sign
affidavits promising never to do so again.162 Tunisian women who
refuse to comply with the ban, face losing their jobs.163 Rights
activists believe the ban to be unconstitutional, and in violation of
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"),
which states that "everyone has a right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion... [and] to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance." 164
In Singapore, a country with a Muslim population of 15
percent, 165 a hijab ban in public schools was introduced in 2002 in an
attempt to promote "religious harmony." 166 The ban does not
extend to Sikh turbans or other religious head coverings. 167 The
hijab ban began when four Muslim girls were suspended from
school for wearing hijab.168  After their suspension, they
unsuccessfully applied to various private schools where hijab bans
157. Id.
158. Edward M. Gomez, Muslim Headscarf Banned - In An Islamic Country, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 20, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/detail?
blogid=15archive/&entry-id=10052.
159. Magdi Abdelhadi, Tunisia Attacked Over Headscarves, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5382946.stm.
160. Gomez, supra note 158.
161. Id.
162. Haboubi, supra note 155.
163. Gomez, supra note 158.
164. Id.
165. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Singapore, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/sn.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
166. Alex Colvin, Muslim Headscarves Around the World Define Religious Expression
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do not apply but, most of the schools were filled to capacity. 169 The
father of one of the girls later moved to Australia with his daughter
so that she would be able to get an education, but the remaining
girls did not have the same opportunity. 170 Sympathizing with the
girls, the Malaysian government offered the students a place in their
schools. 171 However, Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong,
warned them and other Muslims not to continue their efforts to
reverse the ban or going outside the country with their campaign. 172
He stated: "For them now to try to push the wearing of the tudung
(hijab) in schools will only cause greater concern to the non-
Muslims, so I would advise them to be quite cautious in this." 1 73
The Singapore hijab ban has now spread to other public institutions
including hospitals and medical clinics. 174 Opponents of the ban
believe it to be in violation of Singapore's Constitution, which
guarantees freedom of religion.
Somalia has also imposed a hijab ban, even though nearly the
entire population is Muslim.1 75 In February 2007, two months after
the Islamic Courts Union regime was removed, the federal
government imposed a hijab ban in an effort to transform Somalia
into a secular state.176 Because of Somalia's long history of political
instability, secular government officials fear anything that may
undermine their political control, and as a result, have banned hijab
because they wrongly view it as a form of political expression.177
This push towards secularism is not limited to schools, but extends
to any public space. To enforce the ban, police officers are allowed
to remove the hijab from women's heads on the street if the women
refuse to remove their hijabs themselves. 178
Although each of the above nations has a unique history and
political atmosphere, the adoption of so many hijab bans illustrates
an alarming trend. Particularly troubling is that the justifications for
169. Echoes of French Muslim Headscarf Debate Heard in Singapore, HUMAN RTs.
WITHOUT FRONTIERS, Feb. 15, 2004, http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/
2004PDF/Singapore_2004.pdf [hereinafter Echos].
170. Id.
171. Protect, Hijab, Hijab Ban News - Quick Briefing - Singapore, http://www.
prohijab.net/english/singapore-hijab-news.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter
Protect Hijab: Singapore].
172. Id.
173. Echoes, supra note 169.
174. Id.
175. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Somalia, http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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the bans are similar from country to country and stem from
misunderstandings, ignorance, and biases towards Islam or the
belief that these bans will make the country appear more "Western"
and secular. In Turkey, the stated concern supporting the ban was
for protecting the public morals and rights and freedoms of others.
In France, it was to promote assimilation, reduce fundamentalism,
and counter sexism. In Germany, the idea was to counter
fundamentalism, oppression, and the refusal to assimilate. Belgium
also aims to counter gender inequality and, fundamentalism, and to
preserve state neutrality. For Britain, state officials claim the
allowance of hijab bans is supported by safety, security, and
learning concerns. In Singapore, it was to promote religious
harmony. And for Somalia, it was to promote a secular state. These
stated purposes all raise valid concerns, but all fail to address how
the hijab would affect these concerns or hinder their efforts.
If assimilation is the goal, expelling Muslim girls from school is
counterproductive. The practice alienates and discriminates against
an already marginalized segment of society. If the concern is to
counter extremism and protect women's rights, the ban also does
not achieve its purpose because Muslim women view the hijab as
something that promotes women's rights. Misguided paternalistic
restrictions on a woman's right to practice her religion, especially a
part of her religion that allows her to define her femininity by
focusing on her mind and spirituality over her body and
appearance, achieves just the opposite of the intended result. If the
concern is extremism, the stated rationales are based on stereotypes,
and attempts to force the removal of hijab, if anything, will lead to
divisiveness. If the concern is state neutrality, singling out a
particular religious group, or placing restrictions on minority
groups, is anything but neutral. Such policies are simply based on
misconceptions of Muslim women and Islam itself, and
unfortunately, cases are now emerging in the United States.
2. The Right to Wear Hijab in American Schools
Although the United States prides itself on being protective of
religious freedom, several incidents have occurred in recent years
affecting the rights of Muslim students and teachers in public
schools. Circumstances requiring the removal of hijab in
educational settings are not as widespread in the United States as
they are in other parts of the world, but nevertheless are
problematic. These incidents are especially troubling because the
courts have not taken a firm stance to protect the First Amendment
rights of Muslim women in an era rife with post-9/11 backlash
against Muslims.
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a. Restrictions on Students
In the United States, the Supreme Court has never ruled on the
constitutionality of hijab bans in public schools and there are
currently no laws prohibiting Muslim students from wearing hijab.
However, the Court's record of religious tolerance is not perfect and
there have been several incidents where Muslim girls were
suspended from school for wearing hijab. With the War on Terror's
political atmosphere, increasing islamophobia, the international
trend to eliminate hijab in the classroom, and recent discriminatory
acts regarding the hijab in the United States, it is also not
unthinkable that broader hijab restrictions may occur in the future.
On September 11, 2003, an 11-year-old Muslim girl was
suspended for the second time from the Ben Franklin Science
Academy in Muskogee, Oklahoma, for wearing hijab. 179 The school
officials based the suspension on the school's dress code aimed at
preventing gang-related activity by prohibiting hats and other head
coverings.18 0 The school's attorney, D.D. Hayes, explained that
federal education rules do not allow for exceptions for religious
beliefs.18 1  He said: "I don't think we can make a special
accommodation for religious wear" since "you treat religious items
the same as you would as any other item, no better, no worse. Our
dress code prohibits headgear, period." 182 About a month later, the
student was finally allowed to return to school wearing her hijab,
and the school changed its dress code to allow students to wear
hijab and other religious head coverings.18 3 This dress code change
occurred as a result of a negotiated six-year settlement agreement
between the school district and Justice Department which was filed
in the United States District Court in Oklahoma.184 The new policy
provides that students must have a "serious" religious belief and
must have a witness vouch for that belief before being permitted to
wear hijab.' 8 5
Similar incidents have occurred in Louisiana and California.
On January 30, 2004, a world history teacher at West Jefferson High
179. Christopher Andrew Eason, 0 Centro v. Ashcroft: American Indians' Efforts to
Secure Religious Freedoms are Paving the Way for Other Minority Religious Groups, 28 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 327, 345 (2003/2004).
180. Id.
181. Muslim Girl Suspended for Headscarf, CNN.CoM, Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.cnn.
corn/ 2003/ EDUCATION/ 10/11/scarf.reut/index.html.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Muslim Girl Can Wear Head Scarf to Oklahoma School, U.S.A. TODAY, May 19, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2004-05-19-head-scarfx.htm.
185. Wing & Smith, supra note 140, at 774.
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School in Harvey, Louisiana, pulled on the hijab of a 17-year-old
student and said "I hope Allah punishes you. I didn't know you
had hair under there." 186 The teacher was later discharged and the
case was never litigated. 8 7  In February of 2004, a Lancaster,
California, computer science professor at Antelope Valley College
ordered a 19-year-old student to remove her hijab or leave the
classroom. 88 He reasoned that the hijab would block the view of
other students in the classroom and became "very furious" when
the student explained that the hijab was for religious reasons. 189 The
professor resigned before the school took disciplinary action against
him.190 Also, on June 19, 2007, a lunchroom supervisor at Seaside
High School in the Monterey Peninsula Unified School District,
California, demanded that a 13-year-old Muslim student, Issra
Omer, remove her hijab, despite her explanation that she wore it for
religious reasons.' 91 Issra felt humiliated after being yelled at in
front of her peers, started crying, and was too embarrassed to attend
summer school the next day.192 She later received an apology from
the lunchroom supervisor, but the school refused to issue a public
apology. 193
At the elite Marine Academy of Science and Technology
("MAST"), which is part of the Monmouth County Vocational
School District in New Jersey, Mona Elgohail, an eighth-grade
honors student, was unable to attend the school because MAST
would not permit her to wear hijab. 194 The MAST program includes
participation in the Naval Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps
("NJROTC"), which requires the students to wear uniforms
supplied by the United States Navy twice a week. The NJROTC
program was created by Congress in 1964 to promote leadership in
youth and includes a curriculum in leadership and citizenship,
naval history, naval operations, seamanship, navigation, maritime
186. Press Release, CAIR, Louisiana Teacher Removed After Hijab Incident (Feb. 3,
2004), available at http://cair-net.org/asp/article.asp?id=1040&page=NR.
187. Id.
188. Teacher Resigns After Muslim Scarf Debate, CNN. COM, Feb. 28, 2004,




191. School Apologizes for Demanding Muslim Girl to Remove Scarf, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,




194. Allen Dean, Muslim Teen Resigns as Student at M.A.S.T. -Scarf Cannot Be Worn
With Uniform, ATLANTIC HIGHLANDS HERALD (N.J.), Sep. 25, 2003, http://www.
ahherald.com/news/2003/0925/elgohailmast.htm.
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geography, oceanography, astronomy, and military drill.195 When
Mona received her uniform, the academy principal told her that
they would "work something out." 196 It was later suggested that
Mona wear a bandana or wig to hide her hair. 197 After Mona's
family made a bandana to match her uniform, it was deemed
unacceptable because it was still partly visible under her hat.198 The
principal then told her that the bandana was in violation of the
regulations from the Department of the Navy. The principal stated
"there is nothing in the regs to provide leeway for her religious
garb." 199 Mona's parents were also told by the superintendent of
the school that "if you want to wear a military uniform you must
wear it according to the protocols" because military veterans hold
great respect for the uniform and to alter it would not be
welcomed. 2 0 The academy permits yarmulkes, the skullcaps worn
by Jewish men, to be worn, but no similar exceptions were made for
the hijab. 201 Similar situations had occurred in other parts of the
country as well, which raises concerns about the ability of Muslim
women to participate in the military.
Although there has not been a case in the United States
determining a Muslim student's right to wear hijab in the classroom,
at least one court ruled on whether schools can prohibit students
from wearing cultural headwraps. In Isaacs v. Board of Education of
Howard County, Maryland,202  Shermia Isaacs, an eighth-grade
student at Harper's Choice Middle School in Maryland, wore a
multicolored headwrap to school in order to celebrate her African-
American and Jamaican heritage. Shermia had been wearing her
headwrap outside of school for the past couple of years, and her
mother, aunt, and grandmother all wear headwraps as part of their
daily attire. When the assistant principal saw Shermia wearing the
headwrap at school, Shermia was taken to the office and asked to
remove it because it was in violation of the school's "no hats"
policy. 2 3 Even after several meetings with Shermia's mother, the
school refused to allow Shermia to go to class wearing the
headwrap. 204  After missing several days of school, Shermia








202. 40 F. Supp. 2d 335, 336 (D. Md. 1999).
203. Id. at 336.
204. Id.
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headwrap to class, and initiated a lawsuit contending that the "no
hats" policy violated her constitutional right to free speech. 205
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
ruled that the right to wear an ethnic head covering was not a
liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment or a right to be secure in
her person under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 206
The court reasoned that the state's legitimate interest in the
adoption of a "no hats rule" outweighed the student's interests to
wear her headwrap. 207 Although none of the following concerns
were raised in the case, the court summarily reasoned that a head
covering could potentially cause "a conflict in the hallways, obscure
the teacher's view, obscure (other) students' view of the blackboard,
allow students to hide contraband, and foster a less respectful
climate for learning." 208 The court failed to detail specifically how
such issues could emerge. The court also did not recognize other
potential solutions to those problems that would not require
Shermia to remove her headwrap. Instead, the court seemed to
determine that the student's interests were outweighed by
hypothetical hassle to administrators, that it would be too difficult
to "decide on hat-by-hat basis whether a particular hat poses
sufficient danger of disruption." 209
The test applied by the Issacs court to determine whether the
head wrap constituted protected speech under the First
Amendment, whether the scarf was intended to convey a particular
message, and if so, whether this message would be understood by
others. 210 The court reasoned that although the head wrap sends a
message that the student celebrates her Jamaican and African
heritage, the court did not find that the message would be
understood by others. 211 The student was required to finish the
school year without her headwrap, but continued to wear it outside
of school. 212
Although the Issacs court determined this case as one of
symbolic speech, the court did leave the door open for increased
protection if additional constitutional rights were invoked,
including freedom of religion. 213 The court noted that invoking
"hybrid constitutional protections" could possibly exempt religious
205. Id.
206. Id. at 339.
207. Id. at 336.
208. Id. at 340.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 336-37.
211. Id. at 337.
212. Id. at 336.
213. Id. at 338-39.
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headgear from the school's "no hats" policy. 214 Although such a
case has not yet been litigated, because government imposed hijab
bans both target freedom of expression in addition to freedom of
religion, they are not "neutral" towards religion and should be
determined under the hybrid-rights exception. Thus, prohibiting
hijab in the classroom would not fall under the lower level of review
of the Free Exercise clause as described in Smith because they are not
neutral in nature and do not merely incidentally affect religious
practices. 215 Rather, because freedom of religion and expression are
both at stake, such cases should fall under the hybrid-rights
exception of Smith, as described in Issacs, and bans restricting hijab
should not be permissible.
Another possible approach to government imposed hijab bans
would be under the rule set forth in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah,216 where any governmental attempt to enact a ban on
hijab would be required to meet the most stringent standards of
strict scrutiny. In this case, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"A law burdening the religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous scrutiny.... [It]
must advance interest of the highest order and must be narrowly
tailored in pursuit of those interests .... [and] will survive strict
scrutiny only in rare cases." 217 So, at least in theory, Muslim
students should be protected from restrictions on their right to wear
hijab. However, considering the fact that Issacs was litigated prior to
September 11, 2001, and considering the subsequent hijab bans in
the classroom in many parts of Europe and the increasing number of
incidents in the United States, it is not clear what position the courts
would take today. This is especially true considering the judicial
standard for Muslim teachers that wear hijab in Pennsylvania,
Oregon, and Nebraska, discussed infra.
b. Restrictions on Teachers
Currently, three states have statutes that prohibit teachers from
wearing religious garb in public school classrooms: Oregon;
Pennsylvania; and Nebraska.218 Until 1998, North Dakota had a
similar statute, which was repealed by the legislature because of
potential First Amendment violations. 219 The Nebraska statute
214. Id.
215. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
216. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
217. Id.
218. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-898 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 342.650 (2008); 24 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 11-1112 (2008).
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-29 (2008); N.D. Legislative Branch, N.D. Legislative
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criminalizes teachers wearing religious garb:
Any teacher in any public school ... who wears, in such school or
while engaged in the performance of his or her duty, any dress or
garb indicating the fact that such teacher is a member or an
adherent of any religious order, sect, or denomination, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and... be fined in any sum not
exceeding one hundred dollars and the costs of prosecution or
shall be committed to the county jail for a period not exceeding
thirty days or both.220
Although all of the anti-religious garb statutes are facially
neutral between religions, the history of the statutes suggests a
discriminatory motivation for their enactment, especially because
they impose criminal penalties. The statutes were first enacted in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of anti-
Catholic sentiment,221 but are used today to discriminate against
other minority religions.
Oregon's Revised Statute ("O.R.S.") section 342.650 under Title
30, Education and Culture, states that "[n]o teacher in any public
school shall wear any religious dress while engaged in the
performance of duties as a teacher." 222 It further states in O.R.S.
section 342.655 that any teacher in violation of these provisions,
"shall be suspended from employment from the district school
board" and the board then shall report the action to the
Superintendent who "shall revoke the teacher's teaching
certificate." 223 In Cooper v. Eugene School District, decided in 1986,
the Supreme Court of Oregon applied the statute to revoke a Sikh
teacher's teaching certificate because she wore a turban.224 The
court found that the purpose of the statute was to maintain state
neutrality and held that the statute neither violated the guarantee of
religious freedom in Oregon's Constitution, nor the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 225 The Cooper court
explained that in order for the law to be valid, the statute "must be
justified by a determination that the religious dress necessarily
contravenes the wearer's role or function at the time and place
Council: Minutes of the Education Services Committee, http://www.legis.nd.gov//
assembly/ 55-1997/ interim-info/ minutes/ es102398.html (providing legislative history
for the appeal).
220. R.R.S. NEB. § 79-898 (2008).
221. United States v. Bd. Of Educ. For the Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882, 893-94 (3d.
Cir. 1990).
222. OR. REV. STAT. § 342.650 (2006).
223. OR. REV. STAT. § 342.655 (2006).
224. Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J, 723 P.2d 298, 308. (Ore. 1986).
225. Id. at 313.
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beyond any realistic means of accommodation." 226 Typically, there
would have to be some sort of sectarian teaching taking place in the
classroom in order to prohibit the religious dress, but the court
determined that prohibiting religious garb was permissible to avoid
the impression that the school approved or shared the religious
beliefs of the teacher, even though wearing religious garb in the
classroom does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.227
The Oregon Supreme Court in Cooper failed to recognize the
difference between living in a pluralistic society, where teachers
from various backgrounds can adhere to their religious beliefs, and
teachers proselytizing in public schools. A teacher with religious or
ethnic dress may be more neutral in the classroom than one who
wears no physical indication of their religious beliefs. Instead, the
court differentiated between the types of religious items that may be
permissible in the classroom. The court found that impermissible
religious dress is something "beyond the choice to wear common
decorations that a person might draw from a religious heritage, such
as a necklace with a small cross or Star of David," 228 even though
the apparent need for neutrality in schools is "most obvious when
the teacher represents the community's dominant religion." 229 In
other words, the Cooper court was allowing a religious decoration
when it isn't a required part of the religion and when it is
"common," even though the court acknowledged that symbols of
the dominant religion require a greater need for state neutrality.
The court then denied the right to wear religious dress even when it
is an actual and required aspect of the minority religion and the
need for state neutrality, according to the court, is less than if it were
a member of a dominant religion wearing religious dress. Despite
this obvious hypocrisy, state neutrality is not achieved by
prohibiting religious minorities from adhering to their dress
requirements. Rather, it promotes intolerance for religious
minorities and leaves the impression that only certain forms of
religion are acceptable in society, those that are "common" and do
not require a particular form of dress. Such practices alienate both
teachers and students from minority religions. This is especially
true when permitting Christian crosses and Jewish Stars of David,
while prohibiting Sikh turbans or Muslim hijab.
Pennsylvania also has a religious garb statute that prohibits
226. Id. at 307.
227. Id. at 308.
228. Id. at 312.
229. Id. at 310.
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teachers from wearing religious garb while teaching. 230 The garb
statute provides:
No teacher in any public school shall wear in said school or while
engaged in the performance of his duty as such teacher any dress,
mark, emblem or insignia indicating the fact that such teacher is a
member of adherent of any religious order, sect or
denomination. 231
Violations of the provision may result in suspension from
employment for one year, and a five-year suspension upon a second
violation.232 Those who violate the statute may also be guilty of a
misdemeanor and fined.233 The statute's legislative history yields
the justification that "it is important that all appearances of
sectarianism should be avoided in the administration of public
schools of this Commonwealth." 234
In 1990, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Board of Education
for the School District of Philadelphia, upheld the Pennsylvania
religious garb statute, after it was challenged by a Muslim teacher
who was fired for wearing hijab.235 Alima Delores Reardon wears
hijab and was a full time substitute teacher in the Philadelphia
School District. Reardon was turned down three times when
reporting for duty as a substitute because of her hijab.236 Reardon
brought her case under Title VII, but the Third Circuit relied heavily
on First Amendment claims made in Cooper. The court held that
because the statute permissibly aided a compelling state interest in
maintaining an appearance of neutrality in the classroom, hijab was
not permitted in the classroom. 237 At the same time, the court
admitted that children would rarely be "sufficiently knowledgeable
to recognize which religion" the "sufficiently unusual" garb
belonged to, except for some Muslim children that recognized that
Reardon's attire was Islamic. 238
Although the Third Circuit acknowledged that the Cooper court
held that wearing religious garb in the classroom did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because more is
needed to constitute "forbidden sectarian influence in the




234. 1985 Pa. Laws page no. 395.
235. Id.
236. Bd. Of Educ. For the Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 884.
237. Id. at 890.
238. Id. at 890-91.
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classroom," the court determined that it need not conclude on this
point since an Establishment Clause claim was not brought in the
suit.239 Nevertheless, the court prohibited Reardon from teaching
while wearing hijab because of state neutrality concerns. Thus, like
Cooper, the court rejected Reardon's right to wear hijab even though
it did not find that accommodating her religion would violate the
Establishment Clause. 240
The School District of Philadelphia decision was narrowed in 1991
when the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in EEOC v. Reads, Inc., held that "colorful headscarves" were not
"religious garb" within the understanding of the Pennsylvania
statute since they are not obviously religious. 241 The facts in Reads,
Inc. involved Cynthia Moore who was interviewing for a position as
a third-grade counselor when her interviewer was "struck" by her
head covering and "suspected" that she was Muslim. 242 When the
interviewer asked Moore how she would respond if students asked
her about her head covering, she responded that she would tell
them that it was a matter of personal choice. 243 Like the other
religious garb cases, there was no evidence presented in Reads
indicating that Moore's hijab would in any way interfere with her
teaching position or have any influence on the children. 244
In coming to its conclusion in Reads Inc., the court recognized
that "religious garb" has not been sufficiently defined. Thus, the
court divided the types of religious garb into several categories: (1)
facially religious garb worn for religious reasons; (2) garb worn for
religious purposes that is perceived to be religious; and (3) religious
garb that is not recognized as religious. 245 The court determined
that this third category will not constitute "religious garb" for
purposes of the statute.246 Thus, in order to gain a favorable
judgment and be permitted to wear hijab in Philadelphia, Moore
had to argue that her hijab was not "religious garb" and that she
wore it in "an attempt to accommodate" her religion, not practice
her religion. 247 She essentially had to prove that her hijab was
inadequate for her religion and would not sufficiently identify her
as a Muslim.248 The court then concluded that Moore's hijab was
239. Id.
240. Bd. Of Educ. For the Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d at 882.
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not religious garb because it did not necessarily indicate her
religion. 249
According to Reads Inc., in order to maintain religious neutrality
and determine whether the teacher's dress constitutes "religious
garb," the inquiry rests on how the dress is perceived by others, not
the teacher's reasons for wearing hijab.2 0 The court made arbitrary
distinctions between individual styles of hijab by suggesting that
colorful hijabs would likely be permissible because they
stereotypically look less Muslim. Although there are different
concerns at stake, this reasoning is also contradictory to the court's
reasoning in Isaacs, where the court denied a student the right to
wear a cultural headwrap to school on the basis that her peers
would not understand the message that she celebrates her Jamaican
and African heritage. 25' In other words, in order for a teacher to be
permitted to wear hijab, the hijab must not appear to be religious;
but if the inquiry involves a student, the religious or cultural
significance must be understood. In 2003, the same court, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
provided that dress codes prohibiting crosses or Stars of David in
the classroom are unconstitutional because they violate the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and there is no compelling state
interest sufficient to require removal. 25 2 Thus, as the law stands
today in Pennsylvania, some religious groups are permitted to wear
religious items that are undisputedly religious in nature, but
Muslims are not unless the item hides the fact that they are Muslim.
It appears that the right to wear religious dress is not guaranteed in
public schools, at least for Muslim students and teachers in some
states.
B. Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Hijab
Employment issues surrounding hijab have emerged in a
variety of settings. Not only do many Muslim women face obstacles
when seeking a job, but there are also challenges once a job is
attained. Such issues have emerged in a variety of fields including
law enforcement, private security, firefighting, retail, and office
settings.
249. Id. at 1160.
250. Id.
251. Isaacs, 40 F. Supp. 2d 335
252. Id.
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1. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination, including on the basis of religion, for both public
and private employers. 253 Title VII states:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of the
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 254
A violation of Title VII is demonstrated if the plaintiff can prove
that she falls within a protected category, including religion, and
that protected category was used as a "motivating factor" in an
adverse employment practice, even if other factors were
considered. 255  There are limited exceptions where distinctions
based on the protected categories are permissible. For example,
employers are allowed to make distinctions if there is a "bona fide
occupational qualification" that is reasonably necessary for the
position. 256
Title VII affirmatively requires employers to accommodate
religious practices. Title VII defines "religion" as including "all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless
the employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business." Thus, the law requires employers to
make reasonable accommodations for religious practices that do not
impose more than de minimis costs on the employer. 257
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 (2007). (prohibiting employment discrimination by the
federal government), 200e(a) (stating that the statute applies to local and state
governments), 200e(b) (defining "employer" to include any company that affects
commerce and has at least fifteen employees for twenty or more weeks in the current or
proceeding year).
254. Id. § 200e-2(a).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
257. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1997).
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Title VII cases fall into two main frameworks: disparate
treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases concern incidents of intentional discrimination.
The 1973 United States Supreme Court decision, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, crafted the analytical framework for disparate
treatment cases. 258 The complainant carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 259 In order to
create an inference of discrimination, the complainant must
establish: (1) that he/she belongs to a category protected by Title
VII; (2) that he/she applied for and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite his/her
qualifications, he/she was rejected; and (4) that after the rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from person's of complainant's qualifications. 260
Although this formula deals with refusal to hire, the Court noted
that the McDonnell Douglas rule would need to be extended to
different fact situations such as discharge or refusal to promote. 261
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination,
no further demonstration of employer intent to discriminate is
necessary. The burden will then shift to the employer to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection." 262  Once the employer has articulated a non-
discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must show that the reason
provided by the employer was not legitimate and not
nondiscriminatory, but was "pretextual," that is, meant to cover up
the real discriminatory motivation in order to prevail on the
claim. 263
Unlike disparate treatment cases, disparate impact actions
under Title VII involve situations where "practices are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation" towards a member or members of
a protected class. 264 This often occurs when employers adopt testing
devices or educational requirements that screen out the plaintiff or
persons of a protected category from hiring, promotions, or
employment benefits. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme
Court determined that in order to make a prima facie case of
discrimination for practices that are neutral on their face, the
plaintiff must show, that in effect, the practice operates to
disproportionately bar members of plaintiff's class from
258. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
259. Id. at 802.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 800.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 804.
264. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1973).
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employment.265 Such disparities are mostly proven with statistical
evidence. Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden is then
on the defendant to show that the challenged practice is "job related
for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity." 266 Once the defendant has put forward such evidence,
the plaintiff then has the opportunity to show that the employer's
practice was not job related. The plaintiff can also prevail by
demonstrating that an alternative procedure would have achieved
the same result with a less discriminatory effect. 267
2. Case Law
Despite established case law, American courts have not always
properly applied Title VII standards to cases dealing with Muslim
litigants. In Wiley v. Pless Security Inc., a Muslim woman wearing
hijab was employed as a security guard at the Georgia Department
of Revenue ("GDR").268 Wiley quit after the GDR prohibited the
wearing of headgear for uniformed security guards and told Wiley
that they would demote and transfer her to another location because
she wore hijab. 269  The GDR reasoned that Wiley's "turban
disturbed the people at the GDR."270 Wiley filed a discrimination
claim based on religion under Title VII. 271 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled for the defendant
on two bases. First, the court stated that it was "hesitant to impute
discriminatory animus to statements made in the course of attempts
to accommodate an employee's religious practice." 272  These
"accommodations" the court referred to consisted of demotion and
transferring the plaintiff to another location. 273 Second, the court
held that because the plaintiff resigned, she could not prove an
adverse employment action, despite the threatened demotion if she
continued to wear hijab. 274
The court's decision in Wiley failed to recognize that demoting
and transferring the plaintiff to another location because of the
biases of other employees at the GDR, is not an accommodation of
265. Id.
266. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §105 (1991).
267. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
268. Wiley v. Pless Security, Inc. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50894, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 12,
2006).
269. Id. at *1-2.
270. Id. at *2.
271. Id. at *1.
272. Id. at *2.
273. Id. at *2-3.
274. Id. at *3.
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religious practices, but an accommodation of religious intolerance.
It is an adverse action made on the basis of religion and is just the
type of "motivating factor" that Title VII seeks to prohibit. The
defendants also could not show that the removal of hijab was a
business necessity; there was no evidence indicating that Wiley's
hijab affected her ability to do her job or imposed any cost, let alone
an unreasonable cost, to the employer. The court's ethnocentricity
was evident in its continued references to the plaintiff's hijab as a
"turban."
A similar case occurred regarding a police officer's right to
wear hijab while in uniform. In August of 2003, a Muslim police
officer, Kimberlie Webb, faced dismissal for wearing her hijab while
on duty as a police officer in Philadelphia. 275 The recently divorced
mother of six had worked for the police force for eight years before
converting to Islam.276 Webb began wearing hijab outside of work
only, because when she discussed her desire to wear hijab at work
in 1998, her supervisor immediately dismissed the issue.277 On
February 11, 2003, Webb sent a memorandum to her commanding
officer, requesting permission to wear hijab while in uniform
pursuant to her religious beliefs. 278 The captain denied her request
citing Philadelphia Police Department Directive 78, which describes
police uniforms.279 Webb left the matter alone for about six months,
but on August 12, 2003, she came to work wearing hijab and the
lieutenant on duty asked her to remove it, a request that Webb
refused. 2 0 She was then reprimanded and sent home without pay
until she agreed to remove her hijab while at work.281 Webb
returned to work the following two days wearing hijab, and when
she declined to remove it, she was again sent home.282 Thereafter,
she returned to work without wearing hijab, but faced disciplinary
charges for insubordination and neglect of duty for refusal to
remove her hijab on August 13 and 14, 2003.283 The disciplinary
charges against Webb resulted in her suspension from work for
thirteen days. 284
Webb filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
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Commission ("EEOC") and subsequently a lawsuit alleging
religious discrimination under Title VII and retaliation. In order to
establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, Webb
demonstrated that: "(1) she holds a sincere religious belief that
conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she informed her employer of
the conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply with
the conflicting requirement." 285 The burden then shifted to the city
to show it "made good faith efforts to accommodate, or that the
requested accommodation would work an undue hardship." 28 6 The
City conceded that it offered no reasonable accommodation, but
argued that the police department would suffer undue hardship if it
were required to accommodate Webb's religious beliefs. 287
In Webb v. City of Philadelphia, the United States District Court
for the District of Philadelphia held that the City demonstrated a
compelling non-discriminatory reason and would suffer undue
hardship if required to accommodate Webb by allowing her to wear
her hijab with her uniform.28 8 The court reasoned that Directive 78
"promote[s] the need for uniformity," and "enhances cohesiveness,
cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force," yet the
court did not indicate just how Webb's hijab would hinder these
goals.289 In addition, the court explained that "prohibiting religious
symbols and attire helps to prevent any divisiveness on the basis of
religion both within the force itself and when it encounters the
diverse population of Philadelphia" because it promotes "religious
neutrality." 290 However, this reasoning rests on the unsupported
assumptions that diversity in the police force will automatically lead
to conflict and that prohibiting the religious practices of minority
religions would promote neutrality, rather than hinder it. The court
cited the problematic decision in United States v. Board of Education,
where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Muslim
teacher could not wear hijab under Pennsylvania's Garb Statute. 291
The court also reasoned that the case was distinguishable from
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, where the Third Circuit
held that a policy prohibiting the wearing of beards for religious
reasons violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.292
The court distinguished that case because unlike the policy in
285. Id. (citing Shelton v. Univ. of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 223 F.3d 220, 224
(3d Cir. 2000).
286. Id. at *2.
287. Id. at *3.
288. Id. at *5.
289. Id. at *4.
290. Id.
291. 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990).
292. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Fraternal Order of Police, which made secular exceptions to uniform
and grooming standards and therefore had to permit religious
exceptions for men with beards, Directive 78 made no official
secular exceptions, even though it made unofficial religious
exceptions where other police officers in Webb wore crosses on their
lapels and religious necklaces with their uniforms without
discipline. 293 The court explained that because Webb could not
show that supervisors condoned or were aware of the unofficial
religious exceptions, the City's motion for summary judgment was
granted. 294
In contrast to the cases discussed above, the case of Stacy
Tobing, a Montgomery County, Maryland, firefighter and
paramedic, provides an example of successful negotiation of a
religious accommodation. Tobing was placed on administrative
leave by her employer, the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue
Service, after she began to wear hijab to work.295 Tobing's
supervisors cited safety concerns for the hijab restrictions, fearing
that in an emergency or fire, someone might pull off her hijab.296
Acknowledging that these were valid and important concerns,
Tobing had already showed her supervisors a special hijab with
Velcro that ripped away when pulled and demonstrated that she
could take her scarf off in seconds if necessary. 297 She was willing to
make the exception for emergency purposes. After being placed on
administrative leave, Tobing involved the Council on American-
Islamic Relations ("CAIR"), a Muslim civil-rights group, and
proposed a fire-retardant hood. Tobing's supervisors finally agreed
that she could wear a navy blue or white hijab while on duty, and
could replace it with a fire-retardant hood and helmet in the event
of a fire. 298 This incident demonstrates that it is possible to find
creative solutions that meet the concerns of both parties, without
hindering religious practice.
Another area where hijab removal cases have emerged is in
relation to department store dress preferences. In Mohammed v. May
Department Stores, an applicant for a sales position filed an action
against the department store for refusal to hire on the basis of
religion.299  Najat Mohammed, a United States citizen, was
interviewed for a full-time sales associate position with the
293. Webb, 2007 WL 1866763 at *5.
294. Id.





299. Mohammed v. May Department Stores, Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 531 (2003).
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defendant when she was asked if she could remove her scarf during
an interview.300 When Mohammed explained that she wore hijab
for religions reasons, she was asked to return the next day for an
interview with the defendant's human resource manager. The next
day, Mohammed was told by the human resource manager that
wearing a scarf violated the store's dress code policy and was a
safety hazard. 30 1  Defendant did not hire Mohammed. 30 2  She
thereafter filed a charge with the Delaware Department of Labor
("DDOL") and the EEOC on November 2, 1999.303 The EEOC then
filed an action against the defendant.
30 4
After September 11, 2001, Mohammed returned to Saudi
Arabia.305 Subsequently, May Department Stores demanded to
depose her.30 6 The EEOC requested a telephonic deposition because
of the difficulty of traveling back to the United States due to Saudi
cultural limitations and restrictions imposed upon Mohammed, but
the defendant refused. 307 The EEOC then attempted settlement
discussions, and agreed to waive the claim in order to recover its
costs and stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice because they
could not guarantee that Mohammed would appear at her
deposition on April 17, 2002.308 Mohammed arrived back in the
United States on April 18, 2002, but was no longer permitted to
continue her action. She then filed an action in court contending
that the EEOC did not adequately represent her interests and that
she was not in privity with the EEOC because she was not in control
of the litigation. 30 9 However, Mohammed's action was dismissed by
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware on the
basis of res judicata. 310
Salient about the Mohammed case is the fact that the court
dismissed her case challenging the EEOC's handling of the matter in
putting its costs before her legal rights. Mohammed returned to
Saudi Arabia after September 11, 2001, when the backlash against
Muslims skyrocketed and stereotypes about Muslim women were
perpetuated pursuant to liberation propaganda. After multiple
attempts to return back to the United States for her deposition, she
300. Id. at 532-33.






307. Id. at 533-34.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 536.
310. Id. at 537.
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finally arrived back in the United States, thirty-six hours after her
scheduled deposition. That thirty-six hour difference determined
the fate of her claim.
Other incidents have emerged requiring the removal of hijab
because of work dress codes, but have not yet been litigated. In
Florida, Danine Hammond, an employee of the Housing Trust
Management Company, was told that she could not wear hijab on
the job. 311 Hammond arrived for her first day of work in August
2004 as a leasing agent for the company, wearing hijab. Hammond
wore her hijab during the interview for the position without
incident, but when she arrived wearing hijab she was told, "You
cannot work here dressed like that" and was sent home.312 The
company policy required employees to wear a uniform consisting of
a short-sleeved shirt and pants, and Hammond was told that she
could not wear her hijab along with the uniform. 313 She lost her job
as a result. Hammond remembers being in shock when she was
told this and stated, "I went home bawling my eyes out." 314
A similar incident occurred at Walt Disney World. In May
2004, Aicha Baha was told she would not be permitted to wear hijab
while working in sales and as a bellhop for the Disney Caribbean
Beach Resort after returning from maternity leave wearing hijab.315
Disney policy requires that employees only wear Disney hats and
visors unless working in a position out of the public view. Baha was
willing to wear Disney attire over her scarf.316 However, Disney
would not permit her to work in public view, and removed her to
the "backstage." 317 Baha stated that she would not be humiliated by
being demoted to the backstage because of her religion.318 Here, it is
difficult to see how wearing a Disney visor over a hijab or wearing
hijab with the uniform would constitute an undue hardship. These
two incidents have yet to be litigated, but represent the types of
issues Muslim women face in the workplace.
Under a Title VII analysis, to establish a prima facie case of
religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) that they are a
member of a protected religious class; (2) that they hold a sincere
311. Arin Gencer, Muslim Woman Sues After Boss Refuses to Allow Her Head Scarf,








318. Henry Pierson Curtis, Former Employee Sues Walt Disney Over Dress Code: Refused
to Remove Muslim Head Scarf, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Orlando, Fla.), May 22, 2004, available
at http://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2004-2nd/MayO4_DisneyCode.html.
Summer 20081
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (3) that the
employer was informed of the conflict; and (4) that they were
disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.
The burden would then shift to the employer to show that they
made good faith efforts to accommodate the plaintiff, or that an
accommodation would constitute undue hardship. In all these
employment religious discrimination cases involving hijab, the
plaintiffs were able to show a prima facie case of discrimination and
that accommodations would not impose undue hardship on the
employers. Yet, despite this showing, in all cases, the courts
deferred to the employers.
C. Hijab Prohibitions During Prison Visits and Periods of
Incarceration
Prison entry is another area where the courts have not ruled to
protect a Muslim woman's right to wear hijab. Both prison visitors
and inmates have litigated cases, but none have prevailed.
In Rhouni v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Cynthia Rhouni
took her son to the Columbia Correctional Institution in Wisconsin
("CCC") to visit his father.319 At CCC, Rhouni was informed that
she would have to remove her hijab in order to enter pursuant to
Wisconsin Administrative Code, Department of Corrections
("DOC") 309, Internal Management Procedures ("IMP") 11, the
section detailing the identification and dress code policy, which
prohibits visitors from wearing hats or other headgear. 320 To no
avail, Rhouni explained that she wears hijab for religious reasons
and explained how her son was having personal problems and
needed to see his father.32 Rhouni even offered to remove her hijab
in the presence of a female guard to ensure that she was unarmed
and not carrying any contraband. 322 However, prison officials
denied her request. 323 Officials required Rhouni to leave her hijab
with the male guard at the front desk for the entire visit, even
though she would then appear in front of male guards, visitors, and
the inmates without her hijab, in violation of her religious beliefs. 324
Rhouni recalled, "I felt naked. I felt I disgraced my family and my
319. Rhouni v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26180
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2005).
320. Id.
321. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Muslim Woman Sues Prison for
Forcing Her to Remove Headscarf in Front of Male Guards and Prisoners, ACLU (May
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religion." 325
After the incident, Rhouni brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the Wisconsin DOC for violations of her constitutional
rights.326 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which bars
suits against the state and its agencies. 327
Despite the court's ruling, on June 15, 2005, the secretary of
DOC policy agreed to change the visitation policy of CCC to allow
visitors to wear religious head coverings, as long as it would not
conceal their identity. 328 The new policy does not even require the
removal of hijab prior to clearing the metal detector at CCC.329
While this is a great achievement for Rhouni and other Muslims and
religious minorities who wish to visit the prison, the policy change
was the result of the secretary's efforts, not the enforcement of the
court. The Rhouni court avoided the merits of the case entirely and
did not, even in dicta, discuss the constitutional importance of
accommodating a person's religious beliefs.
In Sihlangu v. Hollar, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia addressed a similar prison policy
denying Muslim women visitors of their right to wear the
religiously required "hejab" during prison visits. 330 The case also
addressed the right of Muslim males to wear the religiously
recommended kufi.331 Abdullah Sihlangu, an inmate and the Imam
of the Muslim prison population, filed an action pro se on January
15, 1992, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking injunctive relief to protect
himself and other Muslims from numerous instances of
discriminatory treatment at the Staunton Correctional Center
("Staunton") and the Virginia Department of Corrections. 332
Sihlangu alleged that Staunton gave state aid to Christian activities
while not providing the same support to other religious functions,
that correctional officers refused to recognize Muslim names, and
that Staunton took away facilities used by Muslims at the prison for
religious services. 333 In addition, Sihlangu opposed the prison
requirement that Muslim women were forced to remove their hijabs
325. Id.
326. Rhouni, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26180 at *1.
327. Id. at *5-6.
328. Wisconsin Prisons to Allow Religious Headwear, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, May
28, 2005, http://www.fac.org/news.aspx?id=15359.
329. Id.
330. Sihlangu v. Hollar, 1993 WL 28806 (W.D. Va. January 26, 1993).
331. Id. at *1. (A kufi is a brimless, short, rounded cap worn by some Muslim men).
332. Id. at *1-2.
333. Id.
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while visiting, while Mennonite women were permitted to wear
their religious bonnets. 334
While the action was pending, Sihlangu sought preliminary
injunctive relief of the hijab ban in order to allow his family and
other Muslim visitors to visit the prison during the Muslim religious
holiday Eid Al-Fitr.335 Sihlangu argued that requiring removal of
hijab at Staunton was "not permissible under their own Operating
Procedures," which did not include any provision forcing visitors to
remove religious head coverings. 336 However, the judge denied
plaintiff's preliminary injunction on the basis that the plaintiff
would not be subjected to "irreparable harm in the absence of such
relief" if his family was not allowed to visit for the religious
holiday. 337
When Sihlangu was released on discretionary parole, the
defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that his
claims for injunctive relief were now moot.338 The court recognized
that parole does not necessarily moot an action. The issue is
whether "the injunctive relief requested will redress an ongoing
injury to the plaintiff in light of the fact that he is no longer
incarcerated." 339 Because Sihlangu was the Imam and would visit
inmates regularly, the court concluded that his action was an
ongoing controversy and referred the case to a Magistrate Judge. 340
However, the court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification
for twenty-seven other Muslim prisoners who sought to intervene
because Sihlangu was a pro se plaintiff and lacked standing to
represent the class because he was on parole and thus did not have
claims "typical" of those of the putative class. 341 Although the court
did not determine the permissibility of hijab in prisons, it effectively
dissolved the action because Sihlangu would no longer have female
Muslim visitors.342
In two cases dealing with wearing hijab while incarcerated, the
courts have denied the rights of Muslim women to wear hijab. In
Safouane v. Fleck, Sarah Safouane was incarcerated as a pretrial
detainee for obstruction because she would not release her baby to
officers in a custody battle. 343 Safouane alleged that King County,
334. Id.
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at *3.
339. Id.
340. Id. at *4.
341. Id. at *5.
342. Id.
343. Safouane v. Fleck, 2007 WL 1031460 (9th Cir. July 26, 2007).
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Washington correctional officers violated her First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion because she was not allowed to wear
hijab while in jail. 344  The United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, granted summary judgment for the
State and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld that decision.345
The court held that in order to establish a free exercise claim, the
inmate must show that the correctional officers "burdened the
practice of [her] religion, by preventing [her] from engaging in
conduct mandated by [her] faith, without any justification
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 346 Notably,
the penological interests of the state were not discussed in the
court's opinion, and deferring to the state, the court explained that
the state "does not have to present evidence to support its proffered
penological interest" when "the inmate does not present enough
evidence to refute a common-sense connection between a prison
regulation and the objective that government's counsel argues the
policy was designed to further." 347 In addition, the court stated that
the inmate must offer an "obvious, easy alternative that fully
accommodates their rights at de minimis cost to penological
interests." 348
Although Safouane did not explicitly challenge the connection
between the prison regulation and wearing hijab, she did provide
the court with an alternative arrangement, that she only be handled
by female prison guards. 349 Not only would this address some of
her modesty concerns without affording additional costs to the
defendant, but it would also afford her beliefs some respect, even if
it did not fully accommodate them. In vet another instance of
judicial ethnocentrism, the court expressed that it did not see how
being handled by female prison guards would have relevance to the
hijab policy.350
There appears to be some disconnect between Safouane's
proposed arrangement and the court's reasoning on the issue.
Depending on the layout of the prison, it may very well be that
having Safouane handled by female prison guards would minimize,
or even negate the possibility of her being visible to male guards
while she is not wearing her hijab. She might have also been
concerned with other modesty concerns in Islam, whereby it is
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her or restrain her. In addition, other possible arrangements could
have been available if the state provided reasons for its hijab
concerns, especially because she was merely a pretrial detainee and
not a prisoner. If the concern was safety, perhaps she could have
been segregated. This would impose minimal cost because she was
detained for short duration. However, the court did not address
any of these concerns or options.
A similar incident occurred in Pennsylvania, but the court
declined to decide whether requiring the removal of hijab while
incarcerated because of a mistake violated the First Amendment. In
Shabazz v. Nagy, Feheemah Shabazz was driving her mother's new
car when she was pulled over by a Philadelphia police officer
because the temporary license tag on her car had expired. 351 After
the officer called the appropriate authorities by radio, she was told
that the tag on the vehicle was reported stolen and took Shabazz
into custody. 352 After consulting with Shabazz's parents and the
automobile agency that issued the tag, it was clear that Shabazz was
entirely innocent of all charges because a mistake had been made.
353
Despite the error, Shabazz remained in custody overnight and was
not allowed to wear her hijab, even though she was visible to male
persons, in violation of her religious beliefs. 354 Shabazz brought an
action against the arresting officers and other police personnel based
upon her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional
rights. 355 The police officers moved for summary judgment.
356
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the initial stop was justified and the officer had probable
cause for the arrest.35 7 The court reasoned that "even if it were to
assume that plaintiff's right to free exercise of her religion,
guaranteed by the First Amendment, was somehow violated when
plaintiff was briefly exposed to the view of males without her head
covering - an issue I find it unnecessary to decide - none of the
named defendants w[ere] involved in the alleged violation." 358 The
Court found it insufficient to hold defendants liable for First
Amendment violations based on the arrest because the arrest was
"merely a background circumstance, not a proximate cause of the
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alleged violation. " 359
Based on the decisions above, the rights of Muslim women
visiting prisons and incarcerated Muslim women have not been
protected from regulations requiring the removal of hijab. In each
case, the court evaded a decision on the merits regarding the
permissibility of hijab in prisons, and dismissed on other bases. The
courts, in each case, did not acknowledge the importance of
accommodating religious beliefs, the emotional and dignitary harms
suffered by the plaintiffs, or the possibility of a good faith
interactive process to find a compromise.
D. Hijab Prohibitions in Driver License Photos
After receiving several reports from Muslim women who were
unable to receive or renew their driver licenses because they wore
hijab, CAIR and hundreds of Muslims from across the nation, called
on the Alabama Department of Public Safety ("DPS") to review their
policy banning all head coverings in state driver license photos.360
Muslim women who wore hijab could not receive their licenses
because DPS required them to remove their scarves while being
photographed. Not only would these women be required to remove
their hijab while being photographed, but the picture of them
without their religious scarf would be seen every time they had to
show their state-issued identification cards. On February 23, 2004,
Muslim women in Alabama won the right to wear hijab in their
driver license photos. However, this victory, which was long
overdue, did not come through a court ruling. 361
Alabama's new policy requires "full-face" driver license photos.
It states that "head coverings or headgear are only acceptable due to
religious beliefs or medical conditions, and even then, may not
obscure any portion of the applicant's face." 362 The new policy went
on to further describe what must be shown: "the head of the
applicant shall be shown from the top of the forehead to the bottom
of the chin and from hairline side-to-side." 363 The policy also states
that "a photograph shall not be taken depicting a person wearing a
traditional facemask or veil that does not permit positive
identification." 364 Thus, although the new Alabama policy permits
359. Id.
360. Press Release, Ala. Dep't Public Safety, DPS Revises Drivers License Photograph
Policy News Release (April 22, 2004), http://dps.alabama.gov/app
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hijab, it does not permit niqab, the form of hijab worn by some
Muslim women where the face is covered with the exception of the
eyes.
The niqab policy for driver license photos was litigated in
Freeman v. State of Florida.365 In February of 2001, Sultaana Freeman
was issued a driver license wearing full niqab in her photo.366 A few
months after September 11, 2001, the Florida Department of
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ordered Freeman to retake her
photo without her niqab.367 When she refused, Freeman's license
was revoked. 368 Freeman believed that Islam mandates that she
wear a niqab, and the Department of Corrections was "clearly
making her choose between violating her religious tenets or
sacrificing her driver license." 369 Freeman brought a lawsuit under
Florida's Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("FRFRA") 370 and
under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution based
on the fact that the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") had
permitted eight hundred thousand photo-less driver permits and
had allowed people to wear wigs, beards, cosmetics, and glasses in
their license photographs. 371  In Freeman, the court considered
whether the state had a compelling interest that outweighed the
right to wear niqab in driver license photos. 372 The court held that
the plaintiff failed to show that the photo requirement "substantially
burdened her free exercise of religion" and dismissed her equal
protection claim based on the fact that the DMV had records of
previous photos for photo-less licenses, enabling identification of
the license-holder if necessary. 373 However, the DMV also had a
previous photo of Freeman without niqab from before she converted
to Islam. Although Freeman was a difficult case because the
plaintiff's face was mostly covered in her new photo, it is important
365. Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
366. Patrick T. Currier, Freeman v. State of Florida: Compelling State Interests and Free




370. Florida's FRFRA under section 761.03, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: "(1) The
government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person: (a) Is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." FLA. STAT. § 761.03 (2003).
371. Id.
372. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 52.
373. Id.
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to note that Freeman was permitted to have a license photo wearing
niqab prior to September 11, 2001.
The Freeman decision relied on so-called experts on the Islamic
faith. The DMV's expert discussed exceptions to the hijab
requirement on the basis of "necessity," citing examples such as that
of medical necessity and identification for burial purposes. 374 In his
opinion, he indicated that such exceptions may apply to state photo
requirements. 375 He also referred to Saudi Arabian laws requiring
full-face photographs for identification purposes for passports and
exam-taking. 376 The court then reasoned that the photo requirement
"merely inconvenienced" Freeman's religious practices and that
"her religion does not forbid all photographs." 377
In contrast to Freeman, there have been a series of cases where
courts have ruled against states requiring photos on licenses in
violation of one's religious beliefs when dealing with Christian
plaintiffs. For example, in Quaring v. Peterson, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged the importance of the state's interest in the photo
requirement, but nevertheless held that such requirements were not
so compelling and could not "unduly burden" First Amendment
rights for the free exercise of religion when there was a sincere
belief. 378 In Quaring, the state of Nebraska required all driver
licenses to contain a color photograph, but made exceptions for
learner's permits, school permits, farm machinery permits, special
permits for those with restricted and minimal driving ability, and
temporary licenses for residents outside of Nebraska when their
licenses expire.379 Quaring refused to have her license photo taken
because as a member of the Christian Pentecostal Church, she
believed that the Second Commandment forbids photographs or
images of God's creations. 380 The Eighth Circuit recognized that
although the plaintiff's religious beliefs were not the same as
mainstream Christianity because they were based on her own literal
interpretations of portions of the Bible, under the First Amendment
analysis, the beliefs to be considered were the subjective beliefs of
the individual. 381  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit ruled that
because the state allowed certain photo-less exceptions to the




377. Id. at 57.
378. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1126 (8th Cir. 1984).
379. NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-406.04 (Reissue 1978).
380. Quaring, 728 F.2d at 1123.
381. Id. at 1124-25.
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and efficiently identify persons was not an adequate state interest.38 2
Similarly, in Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of
Prayer, Inc., another case involving Christian members of the
Pentecostal Church who believed that the Second Commandment
prohibited the taking of photographs, the Indiana Supreme Court
ruled that because alternative identification methods were available
to maintain safety, the state interest in public safety was not enough
to burden religious freedom. 383 The court reasoned that when the
free exercise of religion conflicts with federal legislation, "such right
may be overbalanced only by those governmental interests 'of the
highest order and those not otherwise served."' 384
The reasoning of the court in Freeman is problematic for several
additional reasons. First, as previously discussed, there are many
interpretations of Islamic principles and one expert's opinion may
not reflect the religious beliefs of other Muslims. Freeman's expert
even testified that the Islamic exceptions did not apply to state
license photographs.385 It is a vast leap of logic for an individual to
infer that because Islam makes exceptions for medical necessity and
identification for burial purposes in addition to a few other
exceptions, that such exceptions extend to DMV photo
requirements. Second, the court should not have considered Saudi
Arabia's practices to support the idea that photo requirements in the
United States should be required. The social and cultural aspects of
Saudi Arabian society and American society are incomparable. It is
also overly simplistic to assume that Saudi practices would
necessarily adhere to Islamic principles, or Freeman's religious
beliefs. Freeman is an American convert to Islam, and has no
connection to Saudi Arabia or its practices. Finally, the court was in
no position to decide what Freeman's religion required. When
dealing with Christian plaintiffs in Quaring and Pentecostal House of
Prayer, the court did not look to mainstream Christianity to
determine whether the religion prohibited photographs, it looked to
the individual plaintiff's beliefs. The courts deciding the cases of
Muslim women seemingly abandoned the Supreme Court's
reasoned caveat that "[ijt is not within judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity
of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds." 386
382. Id.
383. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d. 1225,
1229 (Ind. 1978).
384. Id. at 1227.
385. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 52.
386. Smith, 494 U.S. 887.
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E. The Transportation Security Administration and Mandatory
Hijab Searches
Airport security measures have been one of the most accepted
and one of the most intrusive practices regarding the removal and
search of hijab. While the maintenance of airport security is
important, many of the security practices have been arbitrarily
enforced without cause. For example, on November 7, 2001, 23-
year-old Samar Kaukab, a United States citizen, was traveling to her
home in Columbus, Ohio, after attending a conference for her job at
Volunteers In Service to America ("VISTA") in Chicago. Kaukab
was selected out of a group of airline passengers and subjected to
several invasive searches. 387  After clearing the metal detector
without setting it off, security staff stopped and searched Kaukab
multiple times with a hand-held metal detector, including her
head.388 After a discussion among security, they conducted another
search with the detector down Kaukab's legs and around her crotch
area before proceeding to a pat-down Kaukab, pulling on her bra
straps and asking her to lift her sweater. 389 After no signals by the
metal detector or other indications that a further search was needed,
the security officials insisted that Kaukab remove her hijab which
she refused to do in public and in front of men. 390 After a lengthy
discussion, the security officials agreed to take her to a back room
where one of the male guards insisted that he search her in the
presence of female guards. 391 Kaukab refused until a female guard
conducted the search. 392 During the search, the female guard
required her to remove her hijab and ran her fingers through
Kaukab's hair and along her scalp, neck, and back. 393 The guard
conducted a complete body search where she pulled on her bra
straps, opened her sweater, patted her breasts underneath her bra,
unbuttoned and unzipped her pants revealing her underwear, and
patted her crotch area and thighs underneath her pants. 394 At no
time during this alarming and intrusive search were there any
indications that Kaukab carried any banned materials or posed a
threat to airport security. 395
Kaukab believed that she was singled out at O'Hare
387. Kaukab v. Harris, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13710, at *8 (N.C. Il1. Aug. 6, 2003).
388. Id.
389. Id. at *9.
390. Id. at *10.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at *11.
394. Id. at *11-13.
395. Id. at*13.
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International Airport because she wore hijab.396 Kaukab filed a civil
rights complaint against several National Guard members,
Argenbright Security Inc., a contact security provider for United
Airlines, and three Argenbright employees. 397 She sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First Amendment right to freedom
of religion, her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and her Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection. 398 In Kaukab v. Harris, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
denied Kaukab's request for relief because there were no further
encounters in the five-month lapse between the incident and filing
of the complaint. 399 The court explained that there is "no realistic
prospect that there will be a need to declare the rights of the parties
for any future purpose" and any possibility of a private security
company screening is mere speculation. 400 Also, the court noted
that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 had since
required that the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA")
take control over passenger screening in all airports. 401 Again, the
court refused a decision on the merits leaving the possibility open
that other Muslim women will be subject to unnecessarily extensive
and intrusive searches without cause.
On August 4, 2007, a new TSA policy went into effect,
subjecting all persons wearing head coverings through security
checkpoints in airports to be searched. 402 The new policy has
sparked protests from Sikh and Muslim organizations because it
often requires Muslims and Sikhs to remove their religious head
coverings at the discretion of each screener. People wearing cowboy
hats or baseball caps are also required to remove them.403 The
policy was instituted to minimize the possibility of having non-
metallic items such as explosives smuggled onto an airplane.404 If
the TSA cannot determine that the "head area is free of a detectable
threat item," passengers will receive a pat-down search, and may be
required to "remove the head covering in a private screening area,"
even if they have cleared the metal detector.405 On October 27, 2007,
396. Id. at *24 n.10.
397. Id. at *1-2.
398. Id.
399. Id. at *31.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Teana Wagner, Religious Groups Weary of TSA Rule, Head-Cover Search Could Lead
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new screening options became available to those subject to pat
downs. They now have the choice to pat down their own turban,
hijab, or head covering, walking through a machine that detects
explosive chemicals, or have their hands swabbed with a cloth that
is tested for chemical traces, but must affirmatively state that they
wish to elect one of these options before being told that they have
the right to do so. 40
6
Although the TSA maintains that it does not conduct ethnic or
religious profiling, Muslim and Sikh community leaders view the
mandatory search policy as an "opportunity for profiling and
violating civil rights." 407 One Muslim woman said that the new
policy was "just a matter of profiling." 408 In reacting to the high
level of discretion the policy gives to individual screeners, Maha
ElGenaidi, the president of the Islamic Networks Group stated,
"There is a problem of abuse depending on who is in charge of a
particular airport and if that individual has any bias towards
Muslims." 4 9 Many Sikh organizations also state that their members
feel that they are being singled out for religious profiling by the new
policy. 410 The executive director of the Sikh Coalition, an advocacy
group for Sikhs, said that the policy "equated our most precious
article of faith with terrorism" and "send[s] a message that the
turban is dangerous [which] sends the wrong message to society." 411
Sikh advocates state that if the intent is to look for nonmetallic
explosives, they should search passengers randomly. 412  Ranjit
Singh, an official with the Sikh American Legal Defense and
Education Fund, said that the new policy is "misguided" and
"subject to abuse," and to require the removal of a turban is like
being "strip-searched." 413  It has also been described as
"demoralizing and demeaning" and administered "without a logical
or reasonable approach." 414
406. Carol Eisenberg, Turbans Won't be Subject to Pat-Downs, TSA Says, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmil/nationworld/2003958059_
turban18.html.
407. Wagner, supra note 402.
408, Id.
409. Neil MacFarquhar, Sikhs Object to Screening Policy for Head Coverings at U.S.





413. Pamela Constable & Dell Quentin Wilber, Turban Searches Rile Sikh Community,
Rule Change Gives Airport Workers Wider Leeway in Screening Headgear, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 9, 2007, at A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
yn/ content/ article/ 2007/09/ 08/AR2007090801606.html.
414. Anju Kaur, Turban Pat-Down Angers Sikhs in Md., Religious Groups See TSA Policy
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The TSA maintains that the policy is neutral and does not target
certain religions or persons. TSA administrator, Kip Hawley, stated:
"Whether it's a cowboy hat or a turban, this is what it is. And it was
not directed at any one type of person or religion. It was directed at
keeping bomb parts off of airplanes." 415 However, Michael
Greenberger, law professor and director of the Center for Health
and Homeland Security at the University of Maryland, stated that
including items like a cowboy hat with the turban, is an attempt by
the TSA to "mask the fact that they are focused on people of Middle
Eastern or Asian background, and are really going after religious
gear." 416  Greenberger explained, "The idea of universally
submitting everyone to headgear screening is overly broad unless
TSA can offer a rationale for the policy change and why this is the
least intrusive way to do it."417 Referring to the new TSA police,
Greenberg stated, "It raises constitutional issues of legitimate
concern." 418
F. Uniform Guidelines and Hijab in Sports Competitions
Although hijab bans in athletic competitions have yet to be
litigated in court, it is unclear what stance the courts would take in
such circumstances. In recent years, the number of Muslim girls
wearing hijab and participating in competitive sports has increased
on the basketball court, track, and playing field.419 Muslim girls
often work out uniform issues by wearing sweats and a long sleeved
shirt under their uniforms along with a matching hijab. Some
Muslim women have even designed athletic wear that adheres to
Islamic dress requirements. For example, Shereen Sabet, a Muslim
microbiologist at California State University, Long Beach, founded
Splashgear, an online swimwear store for Muslim women. 420 Sabet
designs special all-body swimsuits made from high-tech synthetic
combinations of polyester, nylon, and Lycra that allow for flexible
and BMI Security Check as a Violation of 'Civil Liberties, BALT. SUN, Sep. 5, 2007, at 1,
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/advisories/documents/BaltimoreSun-Turbanpatdown
angersSikhsinMD-9-6-07.pdf.
415. Constable & Wilber, supra note 413, at 2.
416. Kaur, supra note 414.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Jeff Karoub, More Muslim Girls Wear Scarf in Games, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-12-15-1911959444_x.htm.
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movement in the water, while adhering to religious requirements. 421
Several Muslim women have purchased the swimsuits, which
include a head cover, in order to participate in swimming,
snorkeling, surfing, and scuba diving.422 In other sports, Muslim
women often get matching hijabs or uniforms custom made in order
to adhere to uniform requirements and participate in competitive
sports. Despite these efforts, several prohibitions on female Muslim
athletes have occurred in recent years because of their insistence on
wearing hijab with uniforms that cover according to Islamic dress
requirements. In addition to the "trash-talk that goes beyond
usually on-court chatter," Muslim girls wearing hijab in sports often
get called "terrorists" and are told to "go back to their own country"
while coaches and referees question or even prohibit uniform
modifications. 423
In the United States, the National Federation of High School
Associations has a rule stating that a player may be allowed to
participate in sports while wearing head coverings for religious
reasons as long as it is not dangerous to other players, and is
unlikely to come off during play.424 However, Muslim athletes often
have to produce letters from state athletic associations granting
permission to wear hijab on a case-by-case basis, because it is not
enshrined in the rules.425 Sometimes the uniform modifications are
permitted, but at times, athletic officials and associations deny a
Muslim athlete's participation on the basis of hijab. For example,
Dewnya Bakri played basketball, volleyball, track, and swimming in
middle school and high school before playing basketball at the
University of Michigan-Dearborn. 426 In high school, Bakri had to
obtain letters from the Michigan High School Athletic Association in
order to wear hijab with her uniform during games.427 In college,
referees refused to let her play basketball while wearing hijab in out-
of-state college tournaments because of her uniform modification. 428
Bakri stated, "I just figured I'm going to play basketball.... I never
thought people might have a problem with it."429 When asked how
she is able to deal with ridicule on the court for wearing hijab, she
said that although it was difficult to gain confidence:
421. Id.
422. Id.








HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
If you allow people to get into your head it will be a difficult task
to focus and do your best. As a Muslim child I was taught
patience and respect. When an ignorant person would make
comments I would simply do two things: try and teach them
about my religion, correcting their misconceptions that they have
been accustomed to. If all else fails I ignore them and try to do the
best I can to excel on the basketball court and gain some respect
that way. 430
In Washington, D.C., Juashaunna Kelly, a high school track star
at the District of Columbia's Theodore Roosevelt High School, was
disqualified over the custom-made outfit she wore in order to
adhere to Islamic dress requirements at the Memorial Invitational
track meet.431 Kelly was wearing the same uniform that she had
worn for three seasons without incident, a custom-made blue and
orange unitard that covered her head, arms, and legs, under her
uniform.432 While the track meet director maintains that Kelly's
uniform violated the rules of the National Federation of State High
School Associations because her uniform was multicolored, Kelly's
mother stated that the officials first asked her daughter to remove
her head covering and believes the incident to be a matter of
religious discrimination. 433 Kelly held the fastest time of any girl in
the city in the one-mile and two-mile races. 434 She had hoped to
qualify at the Montgomery Invitational for the New l alance
Collegiate Invitational in New York, which attracts college
recruiters, but her disqualification prevented her from doing so. 435
In April of 2005 in Tampa, Florida, 12-year-old Briana Canty, a
sixth-grade student at Greco Middle School was given a choice at
the Amateur Athletic Union basketball tournament to either remove
her hijab or sit on the bench.436 When asked about her decision to sit
out, Briana stated "It's my religion, and I'd rather follow my religion
than to break it to play basketball." 437 The tournament officials cited
NCAA rules, even though they apply only to college sports, stating
that they do not permit the wearing of head coverings during
430. Alyssa Ryerson, Student Featured in Nationally-Run News Article, MICHIGAN
JOURNAL (Univ. of Mich. Student Newspaper), Jan. 15, 2008, http://media.www.
themichiganjournalcom/media/ storage/paper255/news/2008/01/15/News/Student.
Featured.In.NationtallyRun.News.Article-3152877.shtml.
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games.438 Briana's mother, Carla Canty, tried to negotiate with the
tournament officials to no avail and turned to CAIR for help. 439 The
officials stated that Briana would only be allowed to play if her
mother would sign an agreement to take responsibility for Briana
and any others who would be injured by the hijab.440 Carla Canty
refused, but the officials eventually allowed Briana to participate
later in the tournament. 441 In reaction to the incident Carla Canty
stated, "It's just kind of sad that they would actually try to tell the
child she can't play because she's wearing her scarf." 442
A similar incident occurred at the University of South Florida in
September 2004 when a 22-year-old basketball player, Andrea
Armstrong, 443 converted to Islam and attempted to wear the hijab to
a team meeting, along with a long-sleeved shirt and pants under her
jersey during practice and games. 444 At first, Armstrong's coach
pulled her aside and told her that she could not wear hijab.445
However, the coach eventually agreed to let Armstrong wear hijab
for travel, but not for games or practices. 446 Armstrong initially
complied, but felt that she was being forced to compromise her
religion and showed up for the team photo wearing hijab. 447 After
she refused to remove her hijab for the team photo, the basketball
coach forced her to quit the team, revoked her athletic scholarship,
and ordered her to empty out her locker and return her textbooks. 448
The coach stated that Armstrong's hijab would make others feel
uncomfortable because Islam oppresses women.449 He also called
Armstrong's parents and told them that their daughter had joined a
cult.450 When asked about why she personally decided to wear
hijab, Armstrong stated that it was part of her religious beliefs and
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intolerance, Armstrong's teammates were supportive of her decision
and stated that they would not judge her for her decision. 452 After
pressure from CAIR, university officials eventually agreed that the
school would accommodate Armstrong's religious practices and
reinstate her athletic scholarship.
45 3
G. Hijab in Court
One of the most disturbing limitations on the right to wear hijab
that has arisen in recent years is the prohibition on hijab in some
courtrooms. Incidents have occurred involving potential Muslim
jurors, Muslim members of the court audience, and Muslim litigants
themselves. Although prohibiting hijab in the courtroom is not a
widespread practice, restricting religious wear in the courtroom is
especially troubling because it denies access to justice system based
on one's religious beliefs.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that juries be selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory
criteria. 454 Yet, at least one case has emerged where a Muslim juror
was dismissed on the basis of hijab. In The People v. Bennett, a
defendant convicted in New York of second degree murder
challenged the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges of
several African-American potential jurors including an African-
American Muslim woman wearing hijab.455 The Muslim woman
was dismissed because the prosecutor felt that her hijab showed "a
certain disrespect for the proceedings." 456  The prosecutor had
stated that if a potential juror's attire was of concern to her, she
would note it, and did note several wardrobe concerns that were
never challenged, except in relation to the juror wearing hijab.457
She also exercised her preemptory challenges for an African-
American social worker and an African-American employee of the
Department of Income Maintenance. 45 8 The court reversed the
defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial because the
prosecutor could not provide a race-neutral explanation for the
challenges. 459
Although the Bennett court properly reversed the conviction for
excluding African-American jurors, it did not acknowledge the
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. J.E.B., Petitioner v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).
455. People v. Bennett, 614 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id. at 432.
459. Id.
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problematic nature of excluding jurors on the basis of religion. The
court merely compared hijab to other wardrobe concerns the
prosecutor had regarding tattoos, Chicago Bulls jackets, and hunter
shirts, which were not challenged, and then concluded the case on
the basis of racial discrimination.460 While there is no doubt that
racial discrimination played a major part in the preemptory
challenges, the court should have discussed preemptory challenges
on the basis of religion as well since the prosecutor specifically
noted that her reasons for excluding the Muslim juror was because
she personally felt that wearing hijab was "disrespectful" to the
court.
Cases have also emerged where members of the court audience
are excluded from the courtroom on the basis of religious dress. In
United States v. James, a case where a narcotics trafficking conviction
was under review, the Seventh Circuit commented on the issue of
having members of the court audience wearing hijab or other
religious head coverings. 461 In the prior proceedings of the case,
which took place in the Southern District of Illinois, the judge did
not allow any "headdresses" in the courtroom and had the
following exchange with the courtroom spectators. 462
[The Court]: As a matter of respect for the Court, the dignity of
the Court does not allow any headdresses, so individuals wearing
any type of headdresses will be asked to leave now or remove
them. Also, no hats, no skull caps, nothing like that is permitted.
Do you folks hear me in the back?
[Unidentified Speaker]: This is my national headdress and also a
part of my religion.
[The Court]: Ma'am, that is not allowed in this courtroom. You
are welcome without it, so please leave until you can take it off.
[Unidentified Speaker]: If Jews were to come in here-
[The Court]: Jews will not wear yarmulkes. I am Catholic and the
Pope would not wear a miter. Please leave, take it off and come
back in, or do not come back in, the choice is yours.463
Defense counsel argued that the district judge violated the First
460. Id. at 383.
461. United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2003).
462. Id. at 957.
463. Id.
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Amendment by excluding spectators whose religions required them
to cover their heads, but the Seventh Circuit ruled against the
defendant for lack of standing because the defendant did not wear a
religious headdress. 464 However, despite the ruling, the Seventh
Circuit did comment on the issue of religious head coverings in
dicta. The court stated, "The Constitution does not oblige the
government to accommodate religiously motivated conduct that is
forbidden by neutral rules, and therefore does not entitle anyone to
wear religious headgear in places where rules of general application
require all heads to be bare or to be covered in uniform ways." 465
The court explained that although it did not need to permit religious
head coverings in the courtroom, the "judicial branch is free to
extend spectators more than their constitutional minimum
entitlement" and tolerance "usually is the best course in a pluralistic
nation." 466  It also noted that most spectators will continue to
remove their head coverings as a sign of respect for the judiciary,
and that those who do not should not be cast out of court or
threatened with penalties. 467
Despite the discussion of the Seventh Circuit, forbidding
religious head coverings in courtrooms is not neutral because it
disparately impacts persons of certain minority religious faiths.
Wearing hijab in a courtroom is not a matter of disrespect to the
court, as it may be with wearing a hat. It is a matter of adhering to
one's dearly held religious beliefs. James is an example of cultural
disconnect; for what the court views is a matter of respect, a
Muslim, Sikh, or Jew perceives as a religious requirement. Such
concerns are magnified when denying litigants access to the
courtroom on the basis of their religious requirements. Although
the issue has yet to be litigated, instances have occurred where
Muslim women were barred from court proceedings based on their
wearing of hijab.
In Georgia, a 20-year-old Muslim woman, Aniisa Karim, was
prohibited from entering the Valdosta municipal court building on
June 26, 2007, unless she removed her hijab 468 Karim, who works
for a Valdosta radio station, was attempting to contest a speeding
ticket in court but was stopped by security. 469 Karim explained that
she wore her hijab because of her religious beliefs, but was
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reasons. 470 CAIR and the Georgia Association of Muslim Attorneys
met with Valdosta representatives to discuss the matter because
they believed that the city's policy violated Karim's constitutional
rights to free speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection. 471
At this meeting, they were told that changes to the rules prohibiting
headwear in court would be considered, but that the current policy
would continue to be enforced.472
Similar policies have been challenged in other parts of the
nation. On January 25, 2006, Mujaahidah Sayfullah, a Muslim real
estate agent, was asked to leave the court by Tacoma Municipal
Court Judge David Ladenburg's judicial assistant because she
wouldn't take off her hijab as required by the court's no-hat
policy. 473 She was in court to support a young family member in a
hearing for a domestic violence issue, when she was approached
and told to either remove her head covering or leave. 474  In
response, Sayfullah explained, "For religious reasons, I'm not
removing my hijab, and I have a right to be in court."475 She then
said that she would wait for the judge to tell her to leave the
courtroom, and when the judge took the bench, she was told to
remove her hijab, and when she refused, she was asked to leave. 476
Sayfullah later described how she felt about the incident: "I felt
publicly humiliated, like I was just not good enough to sit in court
because of my religious beliefs." 477 After involvement by CAIR, the
municipal court judges drafted a policy to create exceptions to the
no hat policy for religious or medical purposes stating: "We're
developing a policy that will remove any future misunderstandings
on this issue. We are not a court that discriminates." 478 Judge
Landenburg later explained that people are asked to remove their
hats out of respect for the court, and issued an apology. 479
In Detroit, a Muslim woman filed a lawsuit after her small-
claims court case was dismissed in the Hamtramck District Court
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was in court to contest a rental car company's charging her S2,750 to
repair a vehicle that was damaged after thieves broke into it.481
Instead of having her day in court, Muhammad was forced to
choose between her case and her religion. She chose her religion
and her case was dismissed. 482 Judge Paul Paruk stated that he
needed to see her face to assess the truthfulness of her statements. 483
Michigan does not have any rules governing religious attire in
courtroom, leaving judges with great leeway in running their
courtrooms. 4 4 In response to the dismissal, Muhammad stated, "I
just feel so sad. I feel that the court is there for justice for us. I
didn't feel like the court recognized me as a person that needed
justice. I just feel that I can't trust the court."48 5
Since Judge Paruk's decision, other judges have commented on
the incident and disagreed with the decision.486 Steve Leben, the
president of the American Judges Association and a Kansas trial
court judge stated that judges should try to seek a balance between
respecting religious views and running their courtrooms. 487 Leben
stated, "if it's a person's legitimate religious belief, we have a duty
to reconcile these competing interests." 488 Mark Somers, chief judge
of the Dearborn, Michigan District Court, said he would not require
a woman to remove her veil during a civil case, "[tbo me, it would
not be an issue. I simply as a matter of personal policy would never
ask someone to do that."489
Conclusion
Both internationally and domestically, Muslim women wearing
hijab are discriminated against. This specific intentional
discrimination appears to be rising in various contexts including
education, employment, sports, incarceration, air travel, the
issuance of state driver licenses, and access to the justice system. In
order to "liberate" Muslim women, ensure "national security,"
promote "safety," or appear "neutral," many actions have been
taken against Muslim women. Examples include: suspending
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disqualifying a high school track star from competing; preventing
young girls from playing basketball; preventing spectators and
litigants from entering court; refusing to issue driver licenses to
hundreds of people; preventing women and children from visiting
incarcerated family members; strip searching innocent travelers in
airports without cause; racial and religious profiling in airports; and
denying jobs to several qualified women, simply because they cover
their hair as required by their religion. These incidents have
occurred not because of a legitimate societal need, but because of the
misunderstandings, stereotypes, and bias against Muslim women
and hijab in the current social and political atmosphere.
All of the purported justifications for the discriminatory acts
described in this note are inadequate and pretextual. For
international hijab bans in Europe, the justifications for hijab bans
varied by country. In Turkey, the justification for banning
thousands of girls and women from obtaining an education or
having government jobs was secularism and "Westernization." In
France and Germany, it was to promote assimilation, reduce
fundamentalism, and counter gender inequality. Belgium possessed
the same concerns, in addition to state neutrality. Britain justified
their ban based on safety and learning concerns. In non-Western
countries, hijab bans are the result of social and political efforts to
appear more "Western" and secular. However, banning hijab helps
none of these concerns. In fact, these bans work against their
proponents' proffered justifications. Discriminating against,
alienating, and oftentimes, isolating Muslim women does not help
assimilation or promote state neutrality. Preventing Muslim women
from defining their femininity through religious practice, so that the
focus is on her mind and spirituality instead of her body, does not
promote women's liberation. It promotes ethnocentricism.
Concerns over extremism are simply based on unfounded
stereotypes.
In the United States, the courts have taken a highly deferential
stance to insufficiently articulated state concerns and have created
double standards for persons of different faiths in cases challenging
discrimination against Muslim women. In the educational context,
"no hats" policies and vague concerns over appearing "neutral" in
the classroom have resulted in Muslim students being suspended
and Muslim teachers being terminated and even criminalized for
adhering to their religious beliefs. At the same time, teachers and
students of non-Muslim faiths are afforded a much more permissive
standard for wearing religious garb. In employment, Muslim
women have been disciplined, demoted, suspended, constructively
discharged, fired, and not hired on the basis of hijab because
employers felt that hijab did not meet uniform or dress code
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requirements. Again, the courts were very deferential to any state
concern over wearing hijab with a police uniform, even though
there were options to accommodate the concerns of both the
employer and employee. In prison settings, courts have again
avoided judgment on the merits of claims brought by prison visitors
and inmates by declaring them moot or barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. For driver license photos, photo-less exceptions were
made for Christian plaintiffs, but no such exceptions were made for
Muslim women. In cases dealing with airport racial and religious
profiling, the courts have again declared the cases moot. The
suspiciously justified and overbroad mechanisms that have been
implemented to screen Muslims and Sikhs in airports, afford great
deference to each airport screener and his or her personal opinion of
whether a person wearing a hijab or turban should be searched.
Finally, for court entry, it is generally within the discretion of each
judge to determine who may enter his or her courtroom. Such
policies and practices are hypocritical and counterproductive in a
nation that prides itself on being the land of the free.
Although there have not yet been blanket prohibitions on hijab
in the United States, it seems they may not be far off. The current
hostile global climate towards Muslims in many countries, and the
concomitant increasing instances requiring the removal of hijab are
particularly alarming. Yet, the approaches of the courts dealing
with hijab have silenced the voices of Muslim women trying to
assert their rights. When a Muslim woman brings a case to court,
the courts have taken one of three approaches: (1) either the court
has failed to protect the right to wear hijab, usually by deferring to
vague or overbroad state concerns; (2) has avoided a judgment on
the merits; or (3) has formulated arbitrary or inconsistent standards
permitting hijab, only in the context that it is no longer identifiable
as hijab. Instead of addressing the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to protect a woman's right to practice her religion by
wearing hijab, the court has yielded to biased and ignorant public
opinion of the social and political climate to determine what
constitutes a fundamental right, thereby reinforcing the hegemonic
norms with facially neutral laws.
Contrary to prevailing misconceptions, Muslim women choose
to wear hijab because of its religious significance and are deeply
distressed when forced to remove their religious garb simply
because dominant western culture has decided it knows what is best
for Muslim women. It is not simply a matter of "inconvenience"
when a Muslim woman is required to remove her hijab - it is
requiring her to violate the tenets of her faith. Such instances of
banning hijab and the uncertainties over the right to wear hijab have
a tremendous impact on the lives of Muslim women including
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severe psychological, spiritual, and emotional repercussions. 490
Such pressures to assimilate in appearance are damaging to
religious freedom and ineffective; they will only further alienate
Muslim women from full participation in society. Some Western
feminists criticize hijab because they see hijab as a symbol of
oppression. Yet, imposing an interpretation of hijab as symbolizing
subordination, imposes the same essentialist control that these
women oppose when it comes to patriarchal norms imposed on
women. Western policies regarding hijab are often what exclude
Muslim women from obtaining the common feminist goals of access
to education, work, driving, participation in sports, and travel for all
women. Such policies hinder the acceptance of Muslim women into
society, which is particularly ironic considering assimilation is often
a reason behind the forced removal of hijab. Thus, although Muslim
women are summarily characterized by some Western feminists as
"oppressed," the oppression Muslim women face wearing hijab in
many parts of the world is due to Western policies and pressures to
outwardly assimilate.
While courts have often avoided decisions on the merits or
ruled against the wearing of hijab, Muslim women have been
silenced by hate crimes and fear, in addition to the overbearing
nature of everyday hurdles that make it difficult to challenge each
instance of discrimination. In times of hostility towards minority
groups, minorities cannot depend on the legislature alone for help.
The courts must help in protecting the rights of minority groups,
especially in cases where constitutional rights are implicated. Only
when the courts take a stand to protect the religious freedoms of
Muslim women, will Muslim women be able to fully participate in
society. Otherwise, an extremely diverse group of people will be
silenced, and the complexities, beliefs, attitudes, contributions, and
challenges Muslims face will be ignored. It is long overdue. The
American legal system and Western Society in general must protect
the constitutional rights of Muslim women and learn the true
meaning of hijab to those who wear it: it is a sign of piety, respect,
protection, pride, egalitarianism, community, identity, privacy,
justice, and beauty. That is worthy of legal protection.
490. This trauma is exacerbated as young girls in school are often pressured by
administrative officials to violate their religious beliefs. Instead of being able to look at
these administrative officials for support and guidance, a strong message is being sent:
your religious beliefs are not accepted, not protected, and that you are viewed as an
outsider in their own nation. For example, one girl in France who was affected by the
hijab ban, grabbed scissors and began to cut all her hair off so that her hair would not
show and she could attend school. See Ward, supra note 83, at 779.
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